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ABSTRACT—Nearly a century ago, the Seventeenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution worked a substantial change in American government,
dictating that the people should elect their senators by popular vote.
Despite its significance, there has been little written about what the
Amendment means or how it works. This Article provides a comprehensive
interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment based on the text of the
Amendment and a variety of other sources: historical and textual
antecedents, relevant Supreme Court decisions, the complete debates in
Congress, and the social and political factors that led to this new
constitutional provision. Among other things, this analysis reveals that the
Amendment requires states to fill Senate vacancies by holding elections,
whether or not they first fill those vacancies by making temporary
appointments. In so doing, the Seventeenth Amendment guarantees that the
people’s right to vote for senators is protected in all circumstances.
Using this interpretation as a baseline, this Article reviews state
practice with respect to the filling of vacancies under the Seventeenth
Amendment. Since the Amendment was adopted in 1913, there have been
244 vacancies in the U.S. Senate. In one-sixth of these cases, the states
have directly violated the Seventeenth Amendment’s core requirement that
senators be elected by popular vote by failing to hold any election. In
addition, in many more cases the states have significantly delayed the
required elections. These practices have cost the people 200 years of
elected representation since the Constitution was amended to provide for
direct election of senators, and there has been little resistance to this pattern
of state defiance of the Constitution.
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APPENDIX B

Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
—Chief Justice Earl Warren, Reynolds v. Sims‡

INTRODUCTION
When Barack Obama resigned from the U.S. Senate to become
President of the United States, Rod Blagojevich, then Governor of Illinois,
saw an opportunity. “I’ve got this thing and it’s fucking . . . golden,”
Blagojevich said, “[a]nd . . . I’m just not giving it up for fucking nothing.”1
Blagojevich was referring to his power to appoint a replacement to fill
President-elect Obama’s vacancy in the Senate. The Seventeenth
† Accessible through the Northwestern University Law Review’s website or SSRN. See The
Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance: Appendices, NW. U. L. REV.,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/v107/n3/1181/LR107n3CloptonAppendices.pdf; SOC. SCI.
RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280361.
‡ 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
1
Telephone call between Rod Blagojevich and Doug Scofield, FBI Session 281, at 3–4 (Nov.
5, 2008, 11:06 AM), available at http://media.apps.chicagotribune.com/blago/5094-session-281blagojevich-home-nov-5-2008.html#document (first omission in original).
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Illinois election laws gave the
state’s governor this appointment power. Governors of nearly every state
have had the chance to appoint replacement senators to fill vacancies in
their states’ senatorial delegations, and they have typically done so without
attracting much notice. In this case, however, things would go much
differently.
Governor Blagojevich thought he might trade the appointment for a
position in the Obama Administration, or use it to secure financial backing
from supporters or to increase his national political stature. But the Feds
suspected that Blagojevich had been practicing pay-to-play politics, and
they had been secretly recording his conversations. Just after Presidentelect Obama resigned his Senate seat, federal authorities arrested
Blagojevich and charged him with fraud and corruption.2 The Illinois
legislature removed Blagojevich from office, and after two trials, a jury
found the ex-governor guilty of charges that he had tried to sell Obama’s
vacant Senate seat.3
Despite his political unraveling, Blagojevich managed to appoint
Roland Burris, a former Illinois attorney general, to serve as Barack
Obama’s replacement in the Senate. Consistent with the Seventeenth
Amendment, Illinois law places the power to appoint temporary
replacement senators solely in the hands of the governor.4 In January 2009,
Burris took his seat in the Senate. Critics questioned the legitimacy of his
appointment, called for his resignation, and offered alternative mechanisms
for selecting a replacement senator,5 but ultimately state and federal
officials decided that Burris would serve as an appointee for the remainder
of President Obama’s vacancy—until January 2011.6 It appeared that the
2

See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Blagojevich, No. 08 CR 888-1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2,
2009), ECF No. 37.
3
While Rod Blagojevich was convicted of all crimes relating to the Senate seat, he was not found
guilty on all counts. Docket Entry, Blagojevich (June 27, 2011), ECF No. 754; Monica Davey & Emma
G. Fitzsimmons, Ex-Governor Found Guilty of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A1 (late
edition).
4
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2010).
5
For example, the Senate Democratic Leadership stated: “We again urge Gov. Blagojevich to not
make this appointment. It is unfair to Mr. Burris, it is unfair to the people of Illinois and it will
ultimately not stand.” Press Release, Senate Democratic Leadership Statement on Gov. Blagojevich’s
Appointment of Roland Burris to the Vacant U.S. Senate Seat from Illinois (Dec. 30, 2008),
available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2008/12/30/senate-democratic-leadership-statement-on-govblagojevichs-appointment-of-roland-burris-to-the-vacant-u-s-senate-seat-from-illinois. An editorial in
the New York Times remarked, “[Illinois]’s Senate seat cannot be filled fairly by such a discredited
blowhard.” Editorial, The Latest from Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at A26. Even months after
Burris took office, local papers called for his resignation, see, e.g., Editorial, Roland Burris, Resign,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 2009, § 1, at 26, and the governor called for a new law that would open the way to
replace him, see Monica Davey, Illinois Governor Urges Senator to Quit and Calls for a Law on
Special Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A14.
6
The state attorney general wrote to the Illinois legislature, “Senator Burris’s temporary
appointment will conclude in January 2011 following an election in November 2010, the next election
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people of Illinois would not have the opportunity to elect a senator to
replace the new President.
This political maelstrom masked a history of state practice that is
inconsistent with the purposes of the Seventeenth Amendment. Since 1913,
that Amendment has required states to hold elections so that the people
may select their senators by popular vote. The Seventeenth Amendment’s
call for direct elections displaced a regime that had existed since the
Framing, in which state legislatures picked senators. The Amendment
applied this preference for direct elections to the regular election of
senators to six-year terms and to the filling of senatorial vacancies. Yet this
Article’s review of state practice reveals that on many occasions the states
have failed to hold elections to fill vacancies, and on many more occasions
there has been a significant lag between the creation of the vacancy and the
election to fill it.
To better understand these data and to inquire into solutions to these
potential lapses, this Article looks to the history of the Seventeenth
Amendment. To date, there has been little study of the meaning of this
important constitutional provision,7 and the Supreme Court has passed up
of representatives in Congress.” Letter from Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, to John J.
Cullerton, President of the Illinois Senate, et al., 2009 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. 09-001, at 3 (Feb. 25, 2009),
2009 WL 530827 (citing 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2A-1.2 (West 2010)); see also Ray Long,
Democrats Vote Down Special Election for Roland Burris Senate Seat, CHI. TRIB. CLOUT ST. (Mar. 5,
2009, 2:40 PM), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2009/03/democrats-vote-down-specialelection-for-roland-burris-senate-seat.html (“Democrats who run the Illinois Senate defeated legislation
today that would have allowed for a special election to replace appointed Democratic U.S. Sen. Roland
Burris before his term ends in January 2011.”).
7
The legal scholarship on the Seventeenth Amendment is scant. Some scholars have criticized the
effect or aims of the Amendment. See, e.g., RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2001); Vikram
David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth
Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Indirect Effects]; Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses
at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U.
L. REV. 500 (1997); Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the
Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671 (1999); Todd J. Zywicki,
Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications
for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165 (1997) [hereinafter Zywicki, Beyond the Shell
and Husk]; Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007 (1994); James Christian Ure, Comment, You Scratch My
Back and I’ll Scratch Yours: Why the Federal Marriage Amendment Should Also Repeal the
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 277 (2007). In addition, Professors Vikram Amar and
Sanford Levinson have written dueling articles about Wyoming’s unorthodox vacancy-filling law,
Vikram David Amar, Are Statutes Constraining Gubernatorial Power to Make Temporary
Appointments to the United States Senate Constitutional Under the Seventeenth Amendment?,
35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (2008) [hereinafter Amar, Gubernatorial Power]; Sanford Levinson,
Political Party and Senatorial Succession: A Response to Vikram Amar on How Best to Interpret the
Seventeenth Amendment, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 713 (2008); Professor Laura Little wrote on the
process of conducting elections to fill vacancies (discussing whether primaries are and should be
required) and touched briefly on the history and structure of the Amendment, Laura E. Little, An
Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629 (1991); and
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opportunities to resolve unanswered questions about its meaning.8 This
Article provides a comprehensive interpretation of the Seventeenth
Amendment based on an in-depth evaluation of the text of the provision, its
historical and textual antecedents, the history surrounding this fundamental
reform, the monumental battle to pass the Amendment in Congress, and
relevant court decisions.
The first paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment presents a
straightforward command: senators are to be popularly elected by the
people of each state.9 The Seventeenth Amendment’s second paragraph
promotes the same democratic reform in situations where Senate seats are
left vacant midterm, while at the same time helping preserve the states’
equal representation in the Senate through temporary appointments.10
Unlike the Amendment’s first paragraph, the second presents a more
challenging interpretive puzzle. This Article attempts to solve that puzzle
and explain what states must do to comply with the Seventeenth
Daniel Shedd wrote a helpful note on the meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment, Daniel T. Shedd,
Note, Money for Senate Seats and Other Seventeenth Amendment Politicking: How to Amend the
Constitution to Prevent Political Scandal During the Filling of Senate Vacancies, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 960 (2011). Finally, a growing political science literature attempts to quantitatively assess the
effect of the Amendment on Senate membership and behavior, see infra note 124, and at least one legal
scholar has joined this group, looking at the treatment of state laws by federal courts before and after
the Amendment, see Donald J. Kochan, State Laws and the Independent Judiciary: An Analysis of the
Effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the Number of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws
Unconstitutional, 66 ALB. L. REV. 1023 (2003). None of these accounts provide a comprehensive
interpretation of the Amendment or examine in detail whether states have complied with its terms.
8
The Supreme Court has only addressed in any detail the part of the Seventeenth Amendment’s
first paragraph that discusses the qualifications of electors. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U.S. 208, 227 (1986). Otherwise, cases on the Amendment are few and far between. Gray v.
Sanders found that a county unit system of primary voting violated the one-person-one-vote principle
enshrined in the Seventeenth Amendment and other provisions. 372 U.S. 368, 379–81 (1963). In
Newberry v. United States, the Court decided that the Seventeenth Amendment did not affect
Congress’s power to regulate elections and held that Congress could not regulate spending for party
primaries and caucuses. 256 U.S. 232 (1921). All other decisions referring to the Seventeenth
Amendment describe the change it caused, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 650–52 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 & n.18 (1985),
or mention it tangentially, U.S. Term Limits, Inc v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995); id. at 881–82
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1982). The Court
has been silent on the Amendment’s vacancy-filling provision except for a summary affirmance in
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 393 U.S. 405 (1969). Most recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Quinn v. Judge, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011), declining a chance to explain the Amendment’s requirements
for filling Senate vacancies.
9
“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by
the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 1.
10
“When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority
of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any
State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” Id. para. 2.
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Amendment when vacancies arise in their Senate delegations. Among other
things, the Seventeenth Amendment requires states to hold elections each
time a seat becomes vacant. State legislatures may give governors
permission to fill vacancies temporarily, but the people ultimately must
elect a new senator. In this way, the first two paragraphs of the Seventeenth
Amendment work in tandem to guarantee that the people will have the right
in all circumstances to elect their representatives in the U.S. Senate.11
With this reading of the Seventeenth Amendment in place, this Article
turns to a detailed examination of the state practice alluded to above. Since
1913, no state has ever violated the command of Paragraph One; following
ratification, the states acted quickly to adopt laws guaranteeing that
senators would be popularly elected to six-year terms, and Congress passed
new laws providing a day for regular elections.12 One would expect this sort
of routine compliance with a provision of the Constitution that
straightforwardly mandates how part of the national government is to be
formed, just as one would expect strict adherence to constitutional
provisions that prohibit denying the franchise on the basis of race or sex, or
to those that set the voting age or outlaw poll taxes.13 It may be surprising,
then, that the states repeatedly and blatantly violate the Constitution when
it comes to how they fill vacancies in the Senate.
Since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, there have been
244 vacancies in the U.S. Senate.14 Data were collected about every
vacancy to determine: how each vacancy occurred; whether it was filled by
an appointee, an elected replacement, both, or no one at all; the time it took
the state to first fill the vacant seat; and the time that the people were left
without elected representation during each vacancy. These data show that
the states have violated the Seventeenth Amendment’s command that
vacancies are to be filled by election in almost one-sixth of all vacancies
since 1913, and the frequency of defiance has only increased during that
time. Further, even when the states hold elections to fill Senate vacancies,
they do not always do so in an expeditious manner. In total, the people
have lost out on nearly 200 years of elected representation since 1913,
during which time Senate seats were left empty or filled by unelected
appointees. These data are out of step with the Seventeenth Amendment’s
focus on popular enfranchisement.
Returning to President Obama’s vacant Senate seat, once Illinois
concluded that its citizens would not elect a replacement senator, two
11

The third and final paragraph of the Amendment reads: “This amendment shall not be so
construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the
Constitution.” Id. para. 3.
12
See, e.g., An Act Providing a Temporary Method of Conducting the Nomination and Election of
United States Senators, Pub. L. No. 63-111, 38 Stat. 384 (1914) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
13
U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI, XXIV.
14
The data and original research can be found in Appendix A.
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voters sued in federal court, alleging a violation of their rights guaranteed
by the Seventeenth Amendment.15 They asked the court to order the
Governor to call an election. The people of Illinois ultimately would be
deprived of elected representation for two years, and the state held the
required election only when a federal court ordered it to do so. In opposing
the election, the State of Illinois argued that the Amendment’s language is
not clear. The analysis provided here rejects this view. Illinois also
submitted that it should be allowed to skip the election because other states
had done the same. This Article catalogs this constitutional defiance,
explains its effect of denying elected representation, and proposes methods
to curb these practices. The states adopted the Seventeenth Amendment to
ensure that the people have the right to elect all of their representatives in
national government. This right should be protected meticulously.
*

*

*

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the first paragraph
of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for regular, direct election
of senators. While its terms are rarely the source of controversy, the first
paragraph’s text and history help provide a comprehensive understanding
of the Seventeenth Amendment. Part II turns to the Amendment’s second
paragraph. That provision directs how vacancies in the Senate should be
filled. The second paragraph is a relatively complicated mechanism for
choosing replacement senators, and it presents a less detailed legislative
history. Still, its meaning is not indeterminate. By closely analyzing the
text and historical record, a cohesive interpretation emerges. This
interpretation then serves as the standard against which state practice is
evaluated in Part III. There, data on every vacancy in the Senate since the
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment are reviewed, revealing that the
states frequently ignore the facial terms of the Amendment and violate its
spirit with even greater regularity. Part IV concludes with a survey of state
law and a proposal for legislation that would promote compliance with the
text and purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment.
I. PARAGRAPH ONE AND POPULAR ELECTIONS
The first paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment replaced a
distrusted, aristocratic regime with one of popular enfranchisement.
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia considered
many mechanisms for selecting U.S. Senators, including direct election, but
ultimately they settled on an indirect model, which placed the choice of

15

See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2010).

1188

107:1181 (2013)

Seventeenth Amendment

senators with the state legislatures.16 The consensus on legislative selection
began to crack soon thereafter. As early as 1826, members of Congress
proposed constitutional amendments to provide for the direct election of
senators.17
Pressure for popular election of senators sprung from many quarters.
Some legal scholars and historians have described this effort as a feature of
the Progressive movement’s drive for democratization.18 Independent of its
connection to any movement, the push for popular elections can be traced
to real and perceived problems with the old system. Reformers stressed that
the legislative selection of senators consumed state legislative agendas with
national issues at the expense of local concerns19 and had the effect of
ceding the right to elect senators to party bosses, caucuses, and political
machines.20 Legislative deadlocks also meant that states were left without
full representation in Congress.21 To outside observers, stories of bribery

16

The original Constitution provided: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also
JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 69–71 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds.,
int’l ed. 1920) (considering proposals to select senators by presidential appointment from a slate of
legislatively nominated candidates, by the House in a similar fashion, by direct election, or by the state
legislatures).
17
See, e.g., 2 REG. DEB. 1347, 1348–49 (1826) (statement of Rep. Henry R. Storrs). There had
been nine such proposals by 1869. See id.; 5 REG. DEB. 361, 361–71 (1829) (statement of Rep. John
Wright); CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1835) (amendment by Rep. Edward Hannegan);
CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1850) (statement of Sen. Jeremiah Clemens); CONG. GLOBE,
31st Cong., 2d Sess. 627 (1851) (statement of Rep. Andrew Johnson); CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st
Sess. 284 (1852) (statement of Rep. Daniel Mace); CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1852)
(statement of Rep. Andrew Johnson); CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1853) (statement of Rep.
Daniel Mace); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1860) (statement of Sen. Andrew Johnson).
President Johnson—a supporter of the direct election of senators—mentioned the issue in his 1868
message to Congress. Andrew Johnson, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 9, 1868), in 8 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3870, 3889 (New York, Bureau of Nat’l Literature,
Inc. 1897).
18
E.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, SENATE ELECTIONS 17–19 (1992); AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 407–12 (2005); ROSSUM, supra note 7, at 191;
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Amending the Constitution: A Plea for Patience, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 677, 684 (1990); Gordon E. Sherman, The Recent Constitutional Amendments, 23 YALE L.J. 129
(1913); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457,
1496–99 (2001). This view contrasts with recent criticism of the Seventeenth Amendment that has
suggested that the Amendment was part of a push by special interests to increase the power of the
federal government. See, e.g., Bybee, supra note 7, at 538–39; Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk,
supra note 7.
19
GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 93–94
(1960) [hereinafter HAYNES, THE SENATE].
20
See GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 39 (1906) [hereinafter HAYNES,
ELECTION OF SENATORS]; Amar, Gubernatorial Power, supra note 7, at 741–42.
21
HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 86.
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and corruption became salient features of the selection process,22 and it
seemed that personal wealth was a prerequisite to joining the Senate.23
Structurally, interposing the state legislatures between the Senate and the
people disfigured the notion of popular representation. Some states were
“misrepresent[ed]” in the Senate when a minority party selected the senator
because of infighting among larger parties.24 Similarly, state legislative
districts might be gerrymandered to prevent equal representation in the
state legislature, meaning that the selected senator would not represent the
entire state.25
With respect to political action, for decades it was the states
themselves that led the charge for democratically elected senators.26 States
amended their constitutions, passed laws, and adopted practices to sidestep
legislative selection of senators.27 They also pressured Congress to adopt a
system for direct senatorial election.28 Political parties also got into the act,
campaigning in favor of direct election.29 Meanwhile, the press continued
22

See, e.g., HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 20, at 51–59. Reformers thought popular
elections would distribute the vote and thus dilute the effect of corruption. Amar, Indirect Effects, supra
note 7, at 1353–54.
23
See HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 20, at 86–91, 95; see also Sara Brandes Crook
& John R. Hibbing, A Not-So-Distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment and Congressional Change,
91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 848 (1997) (describing the effect of wealth).
24
HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 20, at 63–65.
25
See Amar, Gubernatorial Power, supra note 7, at 746. Notably, this malapportionment of state
officials typically underrepresented urban centers and African-American populations, and, regrettably,
opponents of reform expressly acknowledged their distrust of these groups. Id. at 747–50.
26
E.g., Bybee, supra note 7, at 537 (“Surprisingly, the bodies that stood to lose power if the
amendment passed—state legislatures—were quite supportive.”).
27
Under the state canvas system, of which the Lincoln–Douglas debates are an example, Senate
candidates campaigned on behalf of state legislators who, in turn, pledged to support them in legislative
elections. C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 87 (1995); William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism,
49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452, 463–64 (1955). State political parties also pressured legislators to vote for
particular Senate candidates. See HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 99. Some states held
primaries to fix a slate of Senate candidates to which state legislators were restricted. Id.; Rossum,
supra note 7, at 708 (counting thirty-three states holding such primaries by the time of the
Amendment). In some of these states, the legislature was all but required to select the primary winner.
See HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 102–04; see also 1 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE, 1789–
1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 394–95 (1988); Direct Election of
Senators, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_
Senators.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (discussing other state constitutional and statutory schemes).
28
By 1913, states had sent 175 memorials to Congress pushing direct election, and many states had
called for a constitutional convention on the issue. HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 96–97;
Rossum, supra note 7, at 708–10.
29
See Rossum, supra note 7, at 708 (noting that 239 party platforms called for direct election); see
also HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 20, at 105–06 (describing the Democratic and
Populist Parties’ platforms); HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 97 (identifying nominee Taft as
supporting an amendment in 1908). Political parties were not alone: other social groups joined the
chorus, especially in the West. Id.
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to provoke (and perhaps reflect) the public desire to elect senators; David
Graham Phillips’s famed series in Cosmopolitan magazine, “The Treason
of the Senate,” is one of many examples.30
The reform movement gained steam in Congress after 1870, but the
real action began in 1909 with the Sixty-first Congress.31 By this time, it
seemed that direct elections were a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the
discussion of direct election in this era became tied up with—if not
overshadowed by—the division of authority over national elections
between Congress and the states.32 The Elections Clause of the Constitution
granted states the power to regulate elections for national office, subject to
the power of Congress to make or alter those election laws.33 Perhaps
seeing an open door to constitutional reform, champions of states’ rights
sought to use proposals for direct elections as vehicles to transfer to the
states the exclusive control over the time, place, and manner of Senate
elections.34 The propriety of such a shift in power became the centerpiece

30

Phillips’s nine-article series was republished as DAVID GRAHAM PHILLIPS, THE TREASON OF THE
SENATE (George E. Mowry & Judson A. Grenier eds., 1964); see also 1 BYRD, supra note 27, at 396–
98 (describing the series’s effect); HOEBEKE, supra note 27, at 97–99 (discussing other media efforts).
In addition to popular media, scholarship focused on reform. The work of George Haynes, in particular,
was influential. See 1 BYRD, supra note 27, at 404–06.
It is worth noting that the various societal pressures coincided with a change in political landscape,
including the addition of seven new western states, which all practiced forms of or advocated for direct
election. See HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 20, at 110, 141–43.
31
The frequency of proposed amendments increased after 1870. See John William Perrin, Popular
Election of United States Senators, 192 N. AM. REV. 799, 799–804 (1910); see also Rossum, supra note
7, at 705 (counting 187 proposals prior to ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment). However, none
was reported out of committee until 1888, fifty years after the first attempt. See H.R. REP. NO. 50-1456,
at 1 (1888). There was a series of successful House proposals. See 24 CONG. REC. 617–18 (1893);
26 CONG. REC. 7782–83 (1894); 31 CONG. REC. 4824–25 (1898); 33 CONG. REC. 4127–28 (1900);
35 CONG. REC. 1721–22 (1902). But each stalled in the Senate. See 1 BYRD, supra note 27, at 398;
HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 106–08. Seven years after rejecting the last of these House
proposals, the Senate (first through Senator Bristow) took up the cause in the Sixty-first Congress. See
S.J. Res. 50, 61st Cong., 45 CONG. REC. 105 (1909).
32
Many proposals for implementing popular election were advanced. Some left the decision
whether to have such elections in the hands of the states, e.g., 5 REG. DEB. 361, 361–71 (1829)
(amendment of Rep. John Wright); 23 CONG. REC. 116, 133 (1892) (proposal of Rep. William Jennings
Bryan); others would have required popular election but would have given the states complete authority
to regulate those elections, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 5 (1892) (accompanying H.R. Res. 90, 52d
Cong. (1892)). Meanwhile, other proposals made popular election mandatory and shifted oversight to
the national government. E.g., 35 CONG. REC. 3922, 3925–236 (1902) (proposal of Sen. Chauncey
Depew).
33
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2001); U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–33 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131–32 (1976). A
superb account of the Elections Clause debates from the Constitutional Convention is found in Jamal
Greene, Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L.J. 1021, 1031–
39 (2005).
34
This proposal first appeared in Senator William Borah’s 1911 draft, which included the line:
“The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by
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of the congressional debate over the direct election of senators in the Sixtyfirst and Sixty-second Congresses.35
Direct election had been a powerful cause for decades, and the
significance of this democratic reform should not be understated. However,
in the legislative history of the Amendment, there was surprisingly little
debate over direct elections, apart from the recurring observation that the
popular enfranchisement enjoyed wide support.36 Nor was there much
discussion of the effects that direct election might have on federalism in
general.37 And finally, there was extremely little discussion of senatorial
vacancies, a central issue in this Article. It was the aforementioned states’
rights question that drove the debate on both sides.38
In the end, Congress democratized the selection of senators without
touching the states’ rights issue. The final version of the Seventeenth
Amendment, which passed both houses of Congress by early 1912, left
intact the division of authority between the federal and state governments
as it had been described in the Elections Clause since the Founding. The
proposed Amendment was ratified quickly by the states.39
The final version of the Amendment promoted democratic reform by
reallocating power within each state, shifting control from the state
the legislature thereof.” S. REP. NO. 61-961, at 1 (1911) (accompanying S.J. Res. 134, 61st Cong.
(1911)).
35
See JOSEPH L. BRISTOW, RESOLUTION FOR THE DIRECT ELECTION OF SENATORS, S. DOC. NO.
62-666, at 8 (1912); 1 BYRD, supra note 27, at 400; HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 109. For
many southern states, “state control over senatorial elections was the price of . . . assent to a popularelection amendment to the Constitution.” Id. at 110 (citing 46 CONG. REC. 2128–30 (1911) (statement
of Sen. LeRoy Percy); 46 CONG. REC. 3536 (1911) (statement of Sen. Augustus Bacon)); see, e.g.,
46 CONG. REC. 2426–27 (1911) (statement of Sen. Charles Curtis); 46 CONG. REC. 2645–57 (1911)
(statement of Sen. William Borah); 46 CONG. REC. 2756–63 (1911) (statement of Sen. Isidor Rayner);
47 CONG. REC. 1535–45 (1911); 47 CONG. REC. 1912 (1911). Opponents of this proposal saw it as
unnecessarily degrading federal power. See, e.g., 46 CONG. REC. 848 (1911) (Sen. George Sutherland);
46 CONG. REC. 1161–69 (1911) (statements of Sens. Norris Brown, Thomas Carter, and George
Sutherland); 46 CONG. REC. 1335–39 (1911) (statement of Sen. Chauncey Depew); 46 CONG. REC.
2491–98 (1911) (statements of Sens. Norris Brown and Jonathan Bourne, Jr.); 47 CONG. REC. 1482–95
(1911); see also 1 BYRD, supra note 27, at 400 & n.39 (citing 46 CONG. REC. 1162, 1166–69 (1911));
HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 110. This debate unavoidably gravitated toward race. See, e.g.,
47 CONG. REC. 1899 (1911) (statement of Sen. Hoke Smith objecting to the “race rider”); 47 CONG.
REC. 1909 (1911) (discussing the role of race); 47 CONG. REC. 1911 (1911) (statement of Sen. James
Reed referring to “[d]ark” influences); S. DOC. NO. 62-666, at 8; 1 BYRD, supra note 27, at 400; see
also 46 CONG. REC. 2657 (1911) (statement of Sen. William Borah: “We have used the Negro as a
political football about as long as our own sense of decency or the Negro’s developing intelligence will
permit.”).
36
See S. REP. NO. 61-961 (1911) (accompanying S.J. Res. 134, 61st Cong. (1911)); 46 CONG. REC.
1103–07 (1911); 46 CONG. REC. 2178–81 (1911).
37
See Rossum, supra note 7, at 711–13. For an exception, see 46 CONG. REC. 2243 (1911)
(statement of Sen. Elihu Root).
38
See supra note 35.
39
See 47 CONG. REC. 1925 (1911) (Senate); 48 CONG. REC. 6347–69 (1912) (House); 38 Stat.
2049–50 (1913) (certification of ratification).
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legislatures to the people. By declining to accept new language on states’
rights, those who framed and voted for the Seventeenth Amendment
reaffirmed a divided system that the Framers of the original Constitution
had thought best: the state and federal governments would continue to
share the stewardship of congressional elections, and the states, in the first
instance, would have the job of passing laws regulating elections—a duty
that now included passing laws to guarantee that the popular elections
required by the new Amendment took place.
After more than a century of legislatively selected senators, the
advocates of greater democratization won an important victory for the
nation’s upper legislative chamber and for the people of the several states.
The result was the simple textual command of the first paragraph of the
Seventeenth Amendment:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.40

The phrase “elected by the people” reflected the decades-long struggle for
the direct election of senators and, in so doing, fundamentally changed
American government.
This first paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment sets out the
procedure for electing U.S. Senators in the normal course, but this move to
greater democratization and the accompanying attention to the federal–state
balance are found in its second paragraph as well. It is to that more
complex textual provision that this Article now turns.
II. PARAGRAPH TWO AND SENATE VACANCIES
Alongside the first paragraph’s command that the people elect their
senators, the Seventeenth Amendment’s second paragraph sets out a
procedure for filling vacancies in the Senate:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the
executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.41

The procedure applies the Amendment’s principal command that people
should elect their senators to all vacancies, and it supplements that rule
with a mechanism by which the states may retain their equal suffrage in the
Senate until an election is held.

40
41

U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 1.
Id. para. 2.
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The second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment requires the
organs of state government to work in tandem—every time a vacancy
occurs—to promote the dual aims of popularly elected senators and equal
suffrage in the Senate: the governor must issue writs of election calling for
an election to fill the vacancy, the legislature may provide for the
temporary appointment of a replacement senator (but may only do so by
empowering the state’s governor to select an appointee), and the legislature
retains the power to regulate state elections, including the election to fill the
Senate vacancy. This necessarily intricate arrangement is the reason for the
relatively complex language quoted above. For present purposes, this
complexity means that the second paragraph of the Seventeenth
Amendment requires closer attention as a textual matter than the first
paragraph. However, the added complexity does not render the vacancyfilling provision ambiguous. This Part will demonstrate the deliberate
design of the constitutional mechanism for filling Senate vacancies and
show that this text effectuates the same democratic purpose as the
Amendment’s first paragraph.
A. Extra-Textual Sources
Before turning to the text, it is helpful to review the legislative history
of the second paragraph and Supreme Court precedents that may shed light
on the text’s meaning. While the legislative history provides clues about
the second paragraph’s meaning, instances of explicit commentary are few
and far between. Of the hundreds of proposals for direct election of
senators introduced in Congress, only a small number contained vacancyfilling provisions.42 While there was variation among proposed vacancy42

See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 50-1456, at 1 (1888) (accompanying H.R. Res. 141, 50th Cong. (1888))
(“[I]f vacancies happen, . . . the executive of the State in which such vacancy occurs may make
temporary appointment until a Senator is elected thereto as provided by the laws of such State.”); H.R.
REP. NO. 52-368, at 1 (1892) (accompanying H. Res. 90, 52d Cong. (1892)) (“When vacancies happen
in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election, as the legislature
may direct.”); H.R. REP. NO. 53-944, at 1 (1894) (accompanying H. Res. 20, 53d Cong. (1894)) (same
as H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 1); S. REP. NO. 54-530, at 11 (1896) (accompanying S. Res. 6, 54th Cong.
(1896)) (“When vacancies happen in the representation from any State by resignation or otherwise, the
executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next general election in such State for
Members of the House of Representatives in Congress, when such vacancies shall be filled by a vote of
the people as aforesaid.”); H.R. REP. NO. 54-994, at 1 (1896) (accompanying H.R. Res. 155, 54th Cong.
(1896)) (“When vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, in the representation of any State in the
Senate, the same shall be filled for the unexpired term thereof in the same manner as is provided for the
election of Senators in paragraph one: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the next general election, in accordance with
the statutes or constitution of such State.”); H.R. REP. NO. 55-125, at 1 (1898) (accompanying H.R. Res.
5, 55th Cong. (1898)) (same as H.R. REP. NO. 54-994, at 1); 35 CONG. REC. 1721–22 (1902) (adopting
H.R.J. Res. 41, 57th Cong. (1902), as amended) (“When vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise,
in the representation of any State in the Senate, the same shall be filled for the unexpired term thereof in
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filling procedures, the differences did not prompt much debate.43 But it is
significant that all of these proposals called for vacancies to be filled by
direct election—everyone in Congress agreed that elections to fill
vacancies were necessary.
Two points in the legislative record reflect serious discussion of a
proposed vacancy-filling provision. In 1892, the House proposed an
amendment that mirrored in nearly all respects the final version of the
Seventeenth Amendment.44 To accompany this proposal, Representative
Tucker wrote a committee report that described the vacancy-filling
provision in unusual detail.45 He said the proposed amendment required

the same manner as is provided for the election of Senators in paragraph 1: Provided, That the
executive thereof shall make temporary appointment until the next general or special election held, in
accordance with the statutes or constitution of such State.”); H.R. REP. NO. 59-3165, at 2 (1906)
(accompanying H.R.J. Res. 120, 59th Cong. (1906)) (same as 35 CONG. REC. 1721–22, except that there
was no comma before “in accordance with the statutes or constitution of such State”); 47 CONG. REC.
96, 106–07 (1911) (S.J. Res. 1, 62d Cong. (1911), introduced by Sen. Bristow) (same as H.R. REP. NO.
52-368, at 1); 47 CONG. REC. 1205 (1911) (proposed substitute of Sen. Bristow) (same as H.R. REP.
NO. 52-368, at 1, except that there was no comma before “as the legislature may direct”).
43
Proposed vacancy provisions offered different rules for when an election should be held to fill a
vacant seat. Some permitted state legislatures to empower executives to appoint replacement senators
until the next general election, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 54-994, at 1 (accompanying H.R. Res. 155); others
said appointments should last until a general or special election, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 57-125, at 6 (1902)
(accompanying H.R.J. Res. 41); and still others said the legislature could set the time of the vacancy
election, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (referring to elections “as the legislature may direct”).
44
The House’s 1892 proposal differs only in that it included an inconsequential comma before the
phrase “as the legislature may direct.” The plaintiffs in Valenti v. Rockefeller argued this comma was
important. See 292 F. Supp. 851, 855 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969) (per curiam).
But no member of Congress gave it a second thought—the comma floated in and out of proposals
without comment. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 5 (accompanying H.R. Res. 90) (recording
Representative Tucker’s initial proposal, with the comma), with 24 CONG. REC. 617–18 (1893)
(reporting the passage of Tucker’s proposal without the comma). Consistent with this view, the Valenti
court attached no importance to the absence of this comma in the final version of the Seventeenth
Amendment. 292 F. Supp. at 855–56.
45
Tucker wrote:
Where vacancies occur the executive of the State shall direct writs to issue for holding the
election by the people to fill the vacancies; or, by law, the legislature may empower the executive
to fill the same temporarily until an election can be had.
Under this clause the governor must order an election to fill the vacancy that has occurred.
This preserves the principle of election by the people. In some States, however, in which there are
annual elections, this would be a hardship, for the vacancy would in most cases not be of long
duration, and to add another State election would be imposing an unnecessary expense on the
people, so that the proviso was thought to be wise by which the governor may be empowered to
fill the vacancy “until the people fill the vacancy, as the legislature may direct.”
Under this provision in a State where there are biennial elections the legislature might direct
that if a vacancy occurred within a year [or any other period it might fix] after the election, the
vacancy should be filled by an election by the people; but if the vacancy occurred more than a
year after the election the vacancy should be filled by executive appointment. This optional
feature in the filling of vacancies was as far as your committee deemed it prudent to go in this
direction.
H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 4–5 (accompanying H.R. Res. 90). Tucker’s third paragraph is addressed in
the context of temporary appointments. See infra notes 112, 121.
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governors to issue writs of election and also permitted the states, in the
interest of resource conservation, to provide for gubernatorial
appointments. This proposal would have allowed vacancy elections to be
held at the same time as regular elections and would have prevented
leaving seats empty in the meantime.
The second substantive discussion of how vacancies should be filled
came from Senator Bristow, in comments about the provision that would
ultimately become the Seventeenth Amendment.46 The vacancy-filling
provision, Bristow said, was just like the mechanism for filling vacancies in
the House of Representatives by election, except that state legislatures
would be allowed to empower governors to make temporary appointments
until an election occurred—modeled on the original Constitution’s
provision for temporary senatorial appointments. These textual antecedents
and Tucker’s and Bristow’s commentaries will be important to the
discussions of the second paragraph’s individual provisions below, but they
do not provide a definitive guide to the second paragraph’s meaning.
The Supreme Court has provided virtually no guidance on the meaning
of the Amendment’s second paragraph.47 When the Court has had the
opportunity to explain how Senate vacancies should be filled, it has
declined to do so. After Senator Robert Kennedy’s assassination, a threejudge district court in New York considered Senate vacancies in Valenti v.
Rockefeller.48 It held that a long delay before an election to replace
46

Bristow said of his vacancy-filling provision:
The Constitution as it now reads, referring to vacancies in the Senate, says:
And if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature
of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting
of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.
Instead of that, I provide the following:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive
authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.
Which is exactly the language used in providing for the filling of vacancies which occur in the
House of Representatives, with the exception that the word “of” is used in the first line for the
word “from,” which, however, makes no material difference.
Then my substitute provides that—
The legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary
appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
That is practically the same provision which now exists in the case of such a vacancy. The
governor of the State may appoint a Senator until the legislature elects. My amendment provides
that the legislature may empower the governor of the State to appoint a Senator to fill a vacancy
until the election occurs, and he is directed by this amendment to “issue writs of election to fill
such vacancies.”
That is, I use exactly the same language in directing the governor to call special elections for
the election of Senators to fill vacancies that is used in the Constitution in directing him to issue
writs of election to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives.
47 CONG. REC. 1482–83 (1911).
47
See supra note 8.
48
292 F. Supp. at 855 n.7. The New York governor appointed Charles E. Goodell on September
10, 1968, to fill the vacancy in the term ending January 3, 1971. See 114 CONG. REC. 26,668 (1968).
Under New York law, the vacancy election would not have occurred until November 1970, despite the
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Kennedy would not offend the Seventeenth Amendment.49 The Supreme
Court summarily affirmed and in doing so chose not to specify what
aspects of the decision it thought correct.50 The Court has since referred to
Valenti in dicta,51 but its guidance on vacancies and the Seventeenth
Amendment ends there. Most recently, the Court declined to address the
issue when it denied certiorari in the appeal of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision requiring an election to fill President Obama’s Senate vacancy.52
Though the Court has not addressed Senate vacancies and the
legislative history is thin, comments from those who designed the
Amendment and their references to earlier aspects of the Constitution offer
some guidance. Against that backdrop, and with the social and legislative
history described in Part I in mind, the meaning of the Seventeenth
Amendment’s second paragraph begins to come into focus.
B. The Principal Clause
The second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment is divided into
two parts. The first part is the “principal clause”; the second is the
“proviso.” The principal clause invokes the broader mission of the
Seventeenth Amendment by requiring an election: “When vacancies
happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive
authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies . . . .”53 A colon follows this statement, marking the start of the
proviso, which further defines the apparatus for filling Senate vacancies.
The proviso reads, “Provided, That the legislature of any State may
empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the
people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.”54
Analysis of the Amendment will proceed part by part, beginning with the
principal clause.

statewide election scheduled for November 1968. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 853 (citing N.Y. ELEC.
LAW § 296 (1968)). The plaintiffs sought a vacancy election in 1968. Id. at 853–54.
49
The majority relied on state practices and policy considerations in its ruling, Valenti, 292 F.
Supp. at 858–62, and was rightly rebuffed by a dissenting judge for doing so, id. at 875–89 (Frankel, J.,
dissenting). Interpretation of the Constitution by reference to the states’ propensity to obey is not
always the best practice. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (calling the states’
practice of segregating schools since the Fourteenth Amendment “inconclusive” as far as the meaning
of that provision was concerned).
50
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 393 U.S. 405 (1969). The summary affirmance renders Valenti “a rather
slender reed” on which to base any future decision. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.5
(1983).
51
See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1982) (discussing how vacant
offices in Puerto Rico are filled).
52
Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958, 2959 (2011).
53
U.S CONST. amend. XVII, para. 2.
54
Id.
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1.

The Trigger

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
Senate . . .
The second paragraph starts with a trigger. A vacancy must “happen”
before the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling mechanism snaps to
life,55 and there is no question the vacancy must precede all other steps
outlined by the text.56 But what causes a vacancy to happen? The answer is
self-evident to an extent, but there are complicated circumstances worth
consideration.
Since the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted, most vacancies have
happened when a senator resigns or dies, which undoubtedly creates a
vacancy and triggers the process outlined in the second paragraph.57 The
original Constitution referred to Senate vacancies created “by Resignation,
or otherwise,”58 and some proposed amendments parroted that language.59
The Seventeenth Amendment, however, did not refer to “resignation” or
any other trigger,60 but there is no evidence that this omission was
significant.61 With respect to resignations, it is most important to observe
that Congress decided early on that its members could resign and that a
vacancy was created once the resignation was effective.62
55

The process described in the original Constitution for filling Senate vacancies was triggered “if
Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. The triggering language of the Seventeenth Amendment mimics the
Constitution’s provision governing House vacancies: “[w]hen vacancies happen in the Representation
from any State.” Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
56
See, e.g., Case IV: James Lanman, of Connecticut (1825), in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS
IN CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 871, 871–76 (M. St. Clair Clarke & David A.
Hall eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) [hereinafter CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS] (“It is not
competent for the Executive of a State, in the recess of a Legislature, to appoint a Senator to fill a
vacancy which shall happen, but has not happened, at the time of the appointment.”); see also Busbee
v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 525 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that the normal expiration of a term does not
create a “vacancy”).
57
See infra Part III.B.
58
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
59
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 50-1456 (1888) (accompanying H.R. Res. 141, 50th Cong. (1888)); S.
REP. NO. 54-530, at 11 (1896) (accompanying S. Res. 6, 54th Cong. (1896)); H.R. REP. NO. 54-994, at
1 (1896) (accompanying H.R. Res. 155, 54th Cong. (1896)); H.R. REP. NO. 55-125 (1898)
(accompanying H.R. Res. 5, 55th Cong. (1898)); 35 CONG. REC. 1721–22 (1902) (adopting H.R.J. Res.
41, 57th Cong. (1902), as amended); 47 CONG. REC. 218 (1911).
60
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 1 (1892) (accompanying H.R. Res. 90, 52d Cong. (1892));
H.R. REP. NO. 53-944, at 1 (1894) (accompanying H.R. Res. 20, 53d Cong. (1894)); S. REP. NO. 61961, at 1 (1911) (accompanying S.J. Res. 134, 61st Cong. (1911)).
61
Bristow did not even mention the omission when comparing his proposal to the original
Constitution. See supra note 46.
62
During the Second Congress, the House Committee on Elections concluded that “[t]he Executive
authority of a State may receive the resignation of a member of the House of Representatives, and issue
writs for a new election, without waiting to be informed by the House that a vacancy exists in the
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That the death of a senator creates a vacancy is similarly established.63
Recently, however, one state has tested this truism. When Senator Robert
Byrd died in 2010, West Virginia officials considered questioning whether
a vacancy was created immediately upon the senator’s death. If the vacancy
did not formally “happen” for a few days, a quirk in West Virginia law
meant that an election to fill the vacancy would not be required.64 This
Kafkaesque idea was abandoned, however, and West Virginia made plans
to fill the vacancy in the 2012 election.65 That did not settle the issue. The
state’s attorney general thought that the state’s idea of waiting until 2012
was “awkward and unintended” and decided that the people should have
the right to vote much sooner;66 a deal was struck, and West Virginia’s
governor was elected to fill the vacancy in November 2010.67
representations of that State.” Case III: John F. Mercer, of Maryland (1791), in CASES OF CONTESTED
ELECTIONS, supra note 56, at 44, 44. In response to questions about a member’s right to resign,
Representative Joshua Seney replied: “it [is] a new and very strange declaration to say that a member
had not a right to resign. . . . Suppose a man who has a large family, and is engaged in a very extensive
and lucrative business, should be elected contrary to his will, must a man so circumstanced be obliged
to resign his business, and to take his seat in the House?” Id. at 46. The Committee agreed. Id. In 1815,
the Senate added that a resignation was effective even if the governor refused to accept it. Case III:
Jesse Bledsoe, of Kentucky (1815), in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS, supra note 56, at 869, 869–
70. For further discussion, see LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, LEX PARLIAMENTARIA AMERICANA:
ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA ¶¶ 486–487, at 197–98 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1874). But see Josh Chafetz,
Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of Representatives,
58 DUKE L.J. 177 (2008) (suggesting that the House had the power to reject resignations).
63
See, e.g., CUSHING, supra note 62, ¶ 484, at 197 (permitting state executives to take official
notice of a senator’s death).
64
West Virginia law provides that an appointed senator may serve the balance of any unexpired
term less than two years and six months. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-3 (LexisNexis 2011). (For an
explanation of how this law permits unconstitutional behavior, see infra Part III.C.) Senator Byrd died
on June 28, 2010, with just days more than two years and six months remaining in his term. It was
suggested that the governor might not declare the seat vacant until July 3, 2010, a date within the twoyear-and-six-month window when state law would not require an election. See Jonathan Allen, West
Virginia Law Murky on Robert Byrd Succession, POLITICO (June 29, 2010, 6:38 AM), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0610/39092.html; Stephanie Condon, Robert Byrd Succession Hinges on
Ambiguous West Virginia Laws, CBSNEWS (June 28, 2010, 12:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301503544_162-20009017-503544.html. There is some ambiguity about who may “declare” a seat vacant;
certainly the Senate judges its own membership, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1, but executives have taken
official notice of vacancies and acted upon them without waiting for word from Congress, and the rules
may depend on whether Congress is in session. See CUSHING, supra note 62, ¶¶ 483–487, at 197–98.
65
See Letter from Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Att’y Gen. of W. Va., to Governor Joe Manchin III
(July 8, 2010), 2010 WL 5139257.
66
See id. at 6 (discussing the governor’s proposed special election).
67
The state attorney general concluded that “the power of the Governor to proclaim a special
election carries with it the power to set the date of the election, filing dates for candidates, and all other
election procedures; without such ancillary power, the authority to proclaim an election would be
meaningless.” Id.; see also infra Part II.B.2. Still, the governor and state legislature worked together to
arrange the vacancy election. Phil Kabler, Special Election Bill Signed, Sealed, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
July 20, 2010, at 1A.
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Apart from death and resignation, the only other vacancies that have
happened in the Senate since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment
have been caused by the Senate refusing or failing to seat a senator.68 The
Senate declined to seat two senators because of charges of fraud and
corruption in 1932 campaigns,69 and it refused to seat either competitor in a
bitterly contested 1974 New Hampshire election.70 The Senate’s failure to
seat a senator is sometimes unavoidable because the elected senator has
died before Congress convenes—Mel Carnahan was elected after dying in
a plane crash,71 and both Keith Thomson and Key Pittman died between
their elections and the start of a new term.72 In addition, the Senate may
create a vacancy by using its constitutional authority to expel members,73
although it has not done so since before the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment.
Incapacity of a senator is an untested way a vacancy may happen. A
federal statute lists incapacity as a reason that a House vacancy might be

68

Sources contemporaneous to the Seventeenth Amendment remark that a legislative body
(including the Senate) may create a vacancy based upon “a refusal to qualify, expulsion, adjudication of
a controverted election or return, disqualification, or acceptance of a disqualifying office.” CUSHING,
supra note 62, ¶ 485, at 197. At least some of these bases have constitutional roots. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3, cl. 3 (age, citizenship, and residency requirements for senators); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (expulsion); id.
art. I, § 6 (incompatibility clause).
Though the Senate can create a vacancy in these ways, the states cannot create a senatorial vacancy
deliberately. See id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“[The Senate] shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”). In practice, however, the Senate depends on the states not
only to hold elections but also to certify results. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1a–1b (2006). A senator will not be seated
without credentials from the state, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE
SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, R. II(1), at 2 (2011); FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S
SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES 695–710 (rev. ed. 1992), although this requirement
occasionally has been waived, id. at 707–08. Thus, while states do not cause vacancies to “happen”
within the meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment, they usually take the first step toward seating
senators. A recent example is the six-month wait to seat Senator-elect Al Franken. Monica Davey &
Carl Hulse, Minnesota Court Rules Democrat Won Senate Seat, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1.
69
App. B, Nos. 57 (Smith) and 190 (Vare). The complete Appendices A and B, reflecting original
research on Senate vacancies, are available at The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a
Century of State Defiance: Appendices, NW. U. L. REV., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
v107/n3/1181/LR107n3CloptonAppendices.pdf, and SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2280361.
70
App. B, No. 141 (Wyman and Durkin). This might be thought of as a “failure to elect.” See Act
for the Apportionment of Representatives to Congress Among the Several States According to the
Ninth Census, ch. 11, § 4, 17 Stat. 28, 29 (1872) (referring to “a failure to elect” that is “upon trial”);
see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 677 (1872) (remarks of Sen. Allen Thurman) (“[T]here
can be no failure to elect except in those States in which a majority of all the votes is necessary to elect
a member . . . .”).
71
See John W. Fountain, Doomed Plane Apparently Had Instrument Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2000, at A21 (describing plane crash).
72
App. B, Nos. 114 (Carnahan), 130 (Pittman), and 243 (Thomson).
73
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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created.74 Assuming incapacity could create a vacancy in the Senate, it is
debatable what constitutes incapacity and who may declare a senator
incapacitated; neither federal statutes nor congressional rules provide an
answer.75 Historical practice is similarly unhelpful: members have been
unable to appear in Congress (sometimes for quite some time) without their
seats being treated as vacant.76 The closest to an example of incapacity
creating a vacancy is when Gladys Noon Spellman was in a coma when her
House term began in 1981. The House decided her seat was vacant for the
new term because she could not appear to take the oath of office.77 But
since the decision came at the start of a term, this case is more like the
Senate refusing to seat any senator, which was discussed above. It is an
open question whether incapacity in the midst of a term causes a vacancy to
happen in Congress.
2.

The Writ of Election

. . . the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to
fill such vacancies . . .
The second half of the principal clause commands the state’s governor
to issue a writ of election in all cases when a vacancy happens. This
command raises two questions: What sort of duty has the Constitution
imposed on the executive? And what is the substance and function of the
writ she issues?
Taking context into account, the first question is answered easily: the
Seventeenth Amendment’s requirement that the governor issue a writ of
election is a mandatory duty. Whether the word “shall” in legal drafting
reflects an affirmative obligation is not a foregone conclusion,78 but when
74

2 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2006). Courts have said this rule applies to the Senate as well. See Pub. Citizen,
Inc. v. Miller, 813 F. Supp. 821, 829 n.8 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 992 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1993). The original
1872 version of this law did not mention incapacity, 17 Stat. 28; “incapacity” appeared when the
Government Printing Office codified the Revised Statutes, Rev. Stat. § 26 (1878).
75
See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22556, INCAPACITY OF A MEMBER OF THE
SENATE 1 (2006).
76
Senator Glass was absent for four years before he died but kept his Senate seat during that time.
Kate Zernike, For Senate, Quirks of Fate Sometimes Decide Majority, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, § 1,
at 44; Elder Statesman, TIME, Feb. 19, 1945, at 20; see also Neil McLaughlin, Can’t Be Forced to
Resign: The Congressman Is in a Coma—And Still in Office, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1986, at A14
(discussing Rep. John Grotberg). Edward Kennedy spent the last months of his life in Massachusetts
while continuing to represent his state in the Senate. Paul Kane, On the Cusp of Historic Majority,
Senate Democrats Miss ‘Pillars,’ WASH. POST, June 9, 2009, at A3.
77
H.R. Res. 80, 97th Cong., 127 CONG. REC. 2916–17 (1981); see also MASKELL, supra note 75, at
4–5 (discussing Reps. Spellman, Nick Begich, and Hale Boggs). But see Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that the House’s power to judge qualifications is limited to requirements
listed in the Constitution).
78
Bryan Garner calls “shall” a “chameleon-hued word,” referring to Hohfeld’s observation, “In any
closely reasoned problem, whether legal or nonlegal, chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear
thought and to lucid expression.” BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 145,
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“shall” introduces duties in the Constitution it is mandatory in nature.79 The
word appears five times in the Seventeenth Amendment alone, including in
the requirement that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State.” The House provision that served as the
model for the second paragraph’s principal clause provides that executives
“shall” issue writs to fill House vacancies,80 and Congress and the courts
have understood this to establish a mandatory duty.81 The legislative history
of the Seventeenth Amendment further supports the view that the state
executive has no discretion about whether to issue the writ of election.82
The framers of the Seventeenth Amendment were concerned about direct
elections, and all proposals for filling vacancies in the Senate called for
elections. Given this evidence, it is safe to conclude that a writ must issue
whenever a seat is left vacant.
Turning to the writ’s substance and function, it is helpful to begin with
historical background. Writs of election have been a necessary part of
British elections for ages.83 Traditionally, the monarch called for the
939–41 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 35 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920)).
The Court usually treats “shall” as a mandatory command when evaluating statutes, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661–62 (2007); Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230,
241 (2001); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998), but not
always, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005).
79
The original Constitution uses the word 191 times; too many times to reproduce here. A review
leaves no doubt that the word conveys unconditional commands in the Constitution: “The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, meaning
that the core of the judicial power cannot be shared, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09
(2011). The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution, federal law, and treaties “shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,” U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2, a mandatory command. The amendments to the Constitution use “shall” 115 times—the only
amendment that does not use the word is the Tenth. Each time the duty imposed is obligatory.
80
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. Bristow described his proposed amendment as “exactly the
language used in providing for the filling of vacancies which occur in the House of Representatives.”
47 CONG. REC. 1482 (1911).
81
E.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 896 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
ACLU of Ohio, Inc. v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333,
1336 (7th Cir. 1970); Fox v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434–36 (W.D.N.Y. 2010); Valenti v.
Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 863 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969) (per curiam); see also
Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2010) (reaching this conclusion with respect to the
Seventeenth Amendment). Jackson invoked an 1804 election dispute in which the House called the
issuance of writs an “indispensable duty.” 426 F.2d at 1336.
82
Bristow said “the legislature may empower the governor of the State to appoint a Senator to fill a
vacancy” but that the government “is directed by this amendment to issue writs of election.” 47 CONG.
REC. 1483 (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted).
83
See H.H. Asquith, The Ballot in England, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 654, 665–66 (1888) (discussing the writ
and the Ballot Act); Ronald H. Fritze, The Role of Family and Religion in the Local Politics of Early
Elizabethan England: The Case of Hampshire in the 1560s, 25 HIST. J. 267, 280 (1982) (describing how
Protestants used the writ to their electoral advantage); H.G. Richardson & George Sayles, The King’s
Ministers in Parliament, 1272–1377, 46 ENG. HIST. REV. 529, 541 (1931) (discussing the writ in the
thirteenth century).
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election of a new Parliament by issuing the writ, affixed with the Great
Seal of the Realm.84 While issuance of the writ is routine in Britain today, it
remains essential to the electoral process.85
The writ made it across the Atlantic as well. Writs of election were
used in the colonies and became the mechanism by which states ensured
that a desired election occurred.86 On the road to the American Revolution,
colonists voiced concern that writs of election were being withheld,
preventing them from electing representatives;87 it was a gripe so
significant that it appeared in the Declaration of Independence.88 Even
before the Seventeenth Amendment, the writ of election was one of just
two writs mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.89 Writs of election were a
common feature of election laws across the country from independence
84

See Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475,
559 (1995); Seth Barrett Tillman, Defending the (Not So) Indefensible, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
363, 377 (2007). Professors Ackerman and Katyal report that King James II, when he fled England in
1688, attempted to stymie government by cancelling writs of election and throwing the Great Seal into
the Thames. “A meeting of a parliament cannot be authorized without writs under the great seal,” the
King said. Ackerman & Katyal, supra (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 2 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF HENRY HYDE, EARL OF CLARENDON 226 n.* (Samuel Weller Singer ed.,
London, Henry Colburn 1828) (quoting 3 F.A.J. MAZURE, HISTOIRE DE LA RÉVOLUTION DE 1688, EN
ANGLETERRE 264 (Paris, Librairie de Charles Gosselin 1825)).
85
Issuing writs for parliamentary elections became more ministerial over time. By the nineteenth
century, Parliament directed the Clerk of the Crown to issue the writs, and the Clerk had to comply or
face charges. CUSHING, supra note 62, ¶¶ 453–455, at 186–87. Still, an election—including one to fill a
parliamentary vacancy—cannot occur without the writ. Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2,
§ 23, sch. 1, pt. 1 (Eng.). Britain is not alone; the writ of election is an ordinary feature of common law
systems. See, e.g., Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. L-9, § 57; Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900, ss 12, 32–33; Parliamentary Elections Act (Chapter 218), §§ 24–25 (Sing.).
86
Evidence of the writ’s use is found in colonial histories, see Foster C. Nix, Andrew Hamilton’s
Early Years in the American Colonies, 21 WM. & MARY. Q. 390, 405 (1964); Richard S. Rodney, Early
Relations of Delaware and Pennsylvania, 54 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 209, 221–23 (1930); The
Proceedings and Minutes of the Governor and Council of Georgia, October 4, 1774 Through November
7, 1775 and September 6, 1779 Through September 20, 1780, 35 GA. HIST. Q. 126, 151 (Lilla M.
Hawes ed., 1951), and in accounts of state practices shortly after the Revolution, see, e.g., Amelia
Williams, A Critical Study of the Siege of the Alamo and of the Personnel of Its Defenders, 36 SW.
HIST. Q. 251, 269–71 (1933).
87
See A General Meeting of the Freeholders of the County of Mecklenburg on the 29th Day of
July, 1774, in Archibald Henderson, An Interesting Colonial Document, 28 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 54, 56 (1920) (“Whereas by the Delay of the Writ of Election for this County, we are
prevented from choosing Representatives, in time, in whom we may confide, to express our sentiments,
upon the important matters Recommended to the members of the late house of Burgesses by some of
the Northern Colonies . . . .”).
88
The Declaration said King George III had “dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for
opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people,” and alluded to withholding of
writs of election: “He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected;
whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their
exercise . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (1776) (emphasis added).
89
Article I, Section 2 requires governors to issue writs to fill House vacancies. The other writ, of
course, is the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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until the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted, and they continue to play a
central role in American elections today.90
Importantly, the writ of election divides responsibilities within the
state. The Elections Clause obliges state legislatures to promulgate
regulations for congressional elections, including elections to fill vacancies,
and that power and obligation is limited only by Congress’s authority to
make or alter election regulations. Through the writ of election, the state
executive calls the election to fill the vacancy and sets its time, place, and
manner, subject to procedural parameters set by state (and sometimes
federal) law.91 For example, a source contemporaneous with the
Seventeenth Amendment demonstrates that the executive’s power under
the House vacancy-filling provision “carries with it the power to fix the
times and places of holding such election in cases where such times and
places are not fixed by law.”92 Therefore, whatever details are left open by
these laws are to be filled by the state executive’s writ.
When the drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment directed state
executives to issue writs of election to fill vacancies in the Senate, they did
not do so in a vacuum. They were implementing in a new context a
90

Writs of election appeared in early state constitutions, for example, DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 5;
GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VII; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 11; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. X; VA.
CONST. of 1776, ch. 2, § 7; NORTHWEST ORDINANCE of 1787, para. 10, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a), and many state
constitutions expressly refer to writs of election today, see ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 46; ARK. CONST. art.
5, § 6; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 6; GA. CONST. art. V, § II, ¶ V; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 12; KY. CONST.
§ 262; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 13; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 77; MO. CONST. art. III, § 14; OKLA. CONST.
art. V, § 20; OR. CONST. art. V, § 17; PA. CONST. art. II, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 25; TEX. CONST.
art. III, § 13; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 7; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 14. In addition, state laws on Senate
vacancies today refer to the writ, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2009); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-10-8-3 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 204D.28 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42(4-a) (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2013);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-12 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-08 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3521.02 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 188.120 (2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West
2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4-9 (2003 & Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-207 (2011); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2005), or to analogous instruments, for example, CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 10700 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-12-201 (2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 140
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2013). It is not always the chief executive who issues writs of election; writs
may be issued by legislators, secretaries of state, marshals, local leaders, or others.
91
There is ample historical evidence that the writ sets the date of an election. See W.F. Craies,
Australasia: Queensland, 11 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 379, 379 (1911) (describing that a member of the
Australian Parliament is payable “from the day appointed in the writ [of election] as the day for taking
the poll for his election” (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Charles E. Lee &
Ruth S. Green, A Guide to the Commons House Journals of the South Carolina General Assembly,
1692–1721, 68 S.C. HIST. MAG. 85, 86 (1967) (remarking that the writ sets the dates that sessions of the
state assembly convened); Letter from Peter Mayo to David Campbell, Governor of Va. (Apr. 15,
1838), in A Description of Seargent S. Prentiss in 1838, 10 J. S. HIST. 476, 477 (Charles S. Sydnor ed.,
1944) (discussing a disputed election in Mississippi and remarking that “the struggle terminated in
discarding all, and the issuing of a writ of Election, to be held on the 23 & 4th days of this month”).
92
GEO. W. MCCRARY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS 166 (Keokuk, R.B.
Ogden 2d ed. 1880).
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mechanism familiar to all common law countries and to all the states, and
one with its own constitutional pedigree. This history confirms that when
the Seventeenth Amendment says the executive shall issue a writ of
election, it means that in every case where a vacancy happens, the
executive has a mandatory duty to call an election to fill the vacancy and to
supply any details about that election (including the date) that state law has
not addressed.
C. The Proviso
Just as the first paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment calls for
popular elections for each new Senate term, the principal clause of the
second paragraph automatically provides that elections will fill vacancies
whenever they happen. But the Amendment’s framers wanted to ensure
that the new procedure for selecting senators did not diminish the states’
voice in the Senate. In the proviso of the second paragraph, they provided a
solution in the form of an appointment power. The proviso was never
intended, however, to undermine the primary command of direct election
contained in the principal clause; instead, it gave the states a way to
maintain their equal suffrage in the Senate until the process described in the
rest of the second paragraph could run its course. To ensure that the
democratic purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment was not compromised,
the proviso divides the appointment power between the state executive and
the state legislature.
1. The Role of a Proviso.—To understand the meaning of the second
paragraph’s proviso, it is first necessary to understand how a proviso
works. A proviso is either an alternative to the principal clause or a
qualification of that clause. If the proviso is an alternative, then the
Seventeenth Amendment would provide two distinct ways that a vacancy
in the Senate can be filled; one would involve a writ of election and the
other would not. However, if the proviso acts as a qualification, then the
governor would be required to order an election in every case and the
governor may, if so empowered, appoint a temporary replacement until the
election takes place.
There is no standard practice in the law when it comes to provisos.
Legal dictionaries are in conflict; a popular one says provisos may serve as
a “condition, exception, or addition,” which provides little guidance.93 The
Supreme Court recently pinpointed the ambiguity: after noting that
93

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (9th ed. 2009). Older dictionaries stake out marginally more
helpful positions. One, for example, says that “[a] proviso differs from an exception . . . . An exception
exempts, absolutely, from the operation of an engagement or an enactment; a proviso defeats their
operation, conditionally.” 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 483 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 15th ed. 1883). While
this is an interesting distinction, this Article is concerned with the separate question whether the proviso
enacts an alternative or a qualification.
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provisos are generally used “to except something from the enacting clause,
or to qualify and restrain its generality,” the Court lamented that a proviso’s
“general (and perhaps appropriate) office is not, alas, its exclusive use. Use
of a proviso to state a general, independent rule may be lazy drafting, but is
hardly a novelty.”94
The Constitution itself, which includes provisos in two other sections,
sheds some light on the situation. Article II provides that the President
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”95 This
proviso is a qualification on the exercise of the treaty power, not an
alternative rule. Article V, meanwhile, sets out the process for amending
the Constitution, followed by a two-part proviso:
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.96

This proviso (at least the part still in effect) places a significant condition
on the amendment power. It is a condition more extreme than anything in
the second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment; it outlines conditions
under which the amendment process may not take place at all. Still, these
other constitutional provisos are best read as conditions and not as
alternatives. This is evidence that the Seventeenth Amendment follows the
same pattern—its proviso further develops the procedure outlined in the
principal clause, rather than providing an alternative route for filling
vacancies.
The substantive legislative history outlined at the beginning of this
Part also supports this reading. Representative Tucker explained his entire
vacancy-filling provision, including the proviso, and concluded, “Under
this clause the governor must order an election to fill the vacancy that has
occurred.”97 He did not say the governor must do so in some circumstances
or in most circumstances—he said the writ must always issue. Tucker’s
proviso thus could not have been an alternative. Senator Bristow took a
similar approach when he described his vacancy-filling language: “My
amendment provides that the legislature may empower the governor of the
State to appoint a Senator to fill a vacancy until the election occurs, and he
is directed by this amendment to ‘issue writs of election to fill such

94

Rep. of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 858 (2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
96
Id. art. V.
97
H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 5 (1892) (accompanying H. Res. 90, 52d Cong. (1892)).
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vacancies.’”98 As far as Bristow was concerned, the required writ worked in
parallel with the power to make temporary appointments.
More broadly, the social and legislative history of the Amendment
stands as an obstacle to any argument that the proviso negates the
governor’s obligation to issue a writ of election. The states and the framers
of the Seventeenth Amendment sought the direct election of senators, and
the inclusion of the writ of election ensures that those elections happen.
The conclusion of this Part returns to the relationship between the principal
clause and proviso, after first examining the components of the proviso in
greater detail.
2.

Empowering the State Executive

That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof . . .
The Framers of the Constitution preferred that state legislatures select
senators, but to avoid “inconvenient chasms in the Senate,” they agreed that
state executives should have the power to appoint replacements in limited
circumstances and for limited periods.99 The Seventeenth Amendment
departs from the original Constitution by dividing the appointment power
between the state executive and the state legislature: the executive may
make a temporary appointment, but only if the legislature has empowered
her to do so.100 The legislature, of course, may decline to extend the
power.101 Today, forty-six states empower their governors to make
appointments;102 all but three have been represented by appointed senators
since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.103
A separate question is whether the legislature’s power to empower the
governor to make appointments implies a power to require the governor to
98

47 CONG. REC. 1483 (1911) (emphasis added).
MADISON, supra note 16, at 363 (statement of Edmund Randolph). The unamended Constitution
provided, “[I]f Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of
any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the
Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. At the Convention,
proposals to eliminate this appointment power were defeated. MADISON, supra note 16, at 364.
100
Although the Seventeenth Amendment says that the legislature empowers the state executive to
make appointments, this empowerment seems to follow the normal lawmaking process. Where the state
constitution provides a veto, for example, the governor may veto a temporary-appointment law. See
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365–69 (1932); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 566
(1916). But see Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093, 1094 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari) (suggesting that the Elections Clause places limits on the
“legislative process” adopted by the states).
101
Article V of the Constitution provides that “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of
its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. V. A vacancy may leave a state temporarily without
two senators, but this can only happen when the state legislature has not provided for appointments or
when the governor has not made an appointment. To the extent these situations deprive states of equal
representation, the states have consented.
102
Infra Part IV.A.
103
See generally App. B.
99
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do so. Some proposals for the constitutional amendment made the
appointment power mandatory,104 but the text adopted as the Seventeenth
Amendment does not. As Professor Vikram Amar has suggested,
“empower” does not mean “require.”105 Understanding the Amendment this
way, state laws requiring appointments may conflict with the
Constitution.106 In the end, this potential conflict between legislatures and
governors may be academic. There have been very few instances in which
states have left seats empty for substantial periods after vacancies were
created,107 which suggests that state legislatures and executives feel the
strong incentive to appoint replacement senators so that their states are
maximally represented in Congress.
A potentially more contentious question is how much authority the
state legislature has to place conditions on the executive’s appointment
power. One view is that the legislature’s power is binary: it may either
grant the executive the power to appoint or not. The other view says that
the legislature may empower the governor to make an appointment and also
control that appointment in some way—for example, by requiring the
governor to appoint a temporary senator of the same party as the senator
who created the vacancy.108 Professor Amar has offered textual and
structural arguments in support of the binary view.109 He observes that the
framers of the Seventeenth Amendment were concerned that poorly
104

H.R. REP. NO. 59-3165, at 2 (1906) (accompanying H.R.J. Res. 120, 59th Cong. (1906))
(“Provided, That the executive thereof shall make temporary appointment[s] . . . .”).
105
Amar, Gubernatorial Power, supra note 7, at 735.
106
At least 14 states appear to require their executives to appoint. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-12-201
(2012); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (LexisNexis 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (2000); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-602(a)(1) (LexisNexis
2010); 2009 Mass. Acts 715 (codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 140(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013));
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.105 (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 1997); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 32-565(1) (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14(A) (2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42(4-a)
(McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-12 (2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 204.002
(West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2005).
107
Only two vacancies have caused gaps in representation longer than six months. App. B, Nos. 3
(Johnston) and 57 (Smith); see also infra note 142 and accompanying text. In Johnston’s case, the
legislature had not empowered the government to make an appointment. See Act No. 410, 1915 Ala.
Acts 364, 364–65.
108
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222(C) (2006) (“[A]ppointee shall be of the same political
party as the person vacating the office . . . .”); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis
2012) (requiring the governor to appoint a senator from a list of three candidates provided by the
vacating senator’s political party); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2010) (same);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (2011) (same). Other potential restrictions could relate to the
timing of the appointment, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1278(A) (2012) (“If the United States Senate
is in session when the vacancy occurs, the governor shall appoint a senator to fill the vacancy within ten
days after receiving official notice of the vacancy.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855(2) (2007) (“[I]f the
United States Senate be in session at the time the vacancy occurs the Governor shall appoint a Senator
within ten (10) days after receiving official notice thereof . . . .”), which should be distinguished from
the timing of the vacancy election.
109
See Amar, Gubernatorial Power, supra note 7.
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apportioned state legislatures did not represent the people; directly elected
governors, on the other hand, do represent the people; and so, the argument
concludes, the proviso must allow for unfettered appointments if there are
appointments at all.110 Support for this view is also found in the fact that the
Constitution alone sets qualifications for membership in Congress.111
Professor Sanford Levinson proposes a more flexible understanding that
would allow state legislatures “to limit the appointment power with
reasonable conditions designed to prevent what the legislature can
reasonably believe would be an abuse of discretionary power.”112 The abuse
that may result from the exercise of the Seventeenth Amendment’s
appointment power is an entirely legitimate concern—one need look no
further than the Obama vacancy discussed in the Introduction.
The plain meaning of “may empower” suggests a binary authority, and
the legislative history reveals no evidence to support a more nuanced
understanding of the relationship between the state legislature and the
governor in this respect. Professor Amar’s structural arguments are also
persuasive. In addition, it is important to consider that too much legislative
control over the appointment power could undermine the people’s right to
elected representation that is guaranteed by the Seventeenth Amendment.
The second paragraph divides power between legislatures and executives to
ensure that the election takes place; if the state legislature could control the
identity of an appointee, there is nothing to stop it from defining a long
term for its chosen appointee as well. Moreover, the concerns raised by
Professor Levinson are best addressed through the ballot box113 and the
legislature’s control over how vacancy elections take place, not through
control over who can be appointed. For these reasons, the start of the
proviso should be read to permit state legislatures to empower but not
compel the state executives to make appointments to the Senate in the
event that a vacancy happens; and the legislature’s choice to do so does not
include a power to micromanage the appointment.

110

Id. at 746–47.
The states cannot add qualifications, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783
(1995); nor can Congress, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
112
Levinson, supra note 7, at 720. Representative Tucker’s commentary suggests that he
envisioned the legislature could condition the appointment power on the timing of the vacancy. H.R.
REP. NO. 52-368, at 5 (1892) (accompanying H.R. Res. 90, 52d Cong. (1892)) (“[I]n a State where
there are biennial elections the legislature might direct that if a vacancy occurred within a year [or any
other period it might fix] after the election, the vacancy should be filled by an election by the people;
but if the vacancy occurred more than a year after the election the vacancy should be filled by executive
appointment.” (alteration in original)); see also supra note 44 (discussing that Tucker’s proposal
differed from the final Amendment by one inconsequential comma).
113
After Minnesota’s governor resigned to have himself appointed to a Senate vacancy by the new
governor, the people voted both players out of office in the next election. Election 2002 Recalls
Minnesota Massacre of 1978, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 6, 2002 (available at LexisNexis).
111
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3.

The Temporary Appointment

. . . to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies
by election . . .
While the state legislatures may not place restrictions on
appointments, there is one important restriction in the Seventeenth
Amendment’s proviso itself: appointments must be temporary. The text
says so, and one need not consult dictionaries or historical sources to
establish that temporary appointments are not permanent. The plain
meaning of this part of the proviso limits the appointee’s term of service to
the time before the election to fill the vacancy.
To the extent that additional support for this view is needed, Senator
Bristow’s commentary stresses the limited duration of all appointments.
“My amendment,” he said, “provides that the legislature may empower the
governor of the State to appoint a Senator to fill a vacancy until the election
occurs . . . .”114 Bristow said his provision was “practically the same” as the
original Constitution’s, under which “[t]he governor of the State may
appoint a Senator until the legislature elects.”115 This history, along with the
plain meaning of the text, supports an interpretation of the Seventeenth
Amendment that requires an election to fill the vacancy in every case,
whether or not there is a temporary appointment.
Before continuing with this phrase-by-phrase analysis, it is helpful to
preview here part of the record of state practice that was briefly mentioned
in the Introduction and that will be discussed at length in Part III. In
particular, one finding of this Article is that states do not always act
expeditiously to fill vacancies in the Senate. In sixty-five cases when a
vacancy election followed an intermediate appointment, the people waited
more than one year for elected representation; in more than twenty cases
they waited more than a year and a half; and in four cases they waited more
than two years.116 These data are raised here because Bristow’s reliance on
the original Constitution suggests one way to think about this pattern of
delay.
Under the original Constitution, state legislatures filled Senate
vacancies, but if a vacancy happened while the state legislature was not in
session, the governor could make a temporary appointment.117 The
114

47 CONG. REC. 1483 (1911); see also id. at 228–29 (statement of Rep. Burton French) (noting
in response to a different vacancy-filling provision that “the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments ‘until the people fill the vacancy by election.’ Words
could hardly be plainer . . . .”).
115
Id. at 1483.
116
See infra Part III.
117
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2; see also GEORGE S. TAFT, COMPILATION OF SENATE ELECTION
CASES FROM 1789 TO 1885, S. DOC. NO. 58-11, at 52–88, 107–42 (1903) (concluding that the governor
could not make an appointment if the state legislature had adjourned without electing a new senator);
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appointment would expire, however, if the legislature selected a new
senator or if it finished the subsequent legislative session without making
any such selection.118 Therefore, appointments before the Seventeenth
Amendment could not have lasted longer than the time needed for a state
legislature to convene and complete a legislative session. The Framers of
the original Constitution understood state legislatures to meet annually.119
For practical purposes, then, the Framers of the original Constitution
capped appointments at one year.120
Returning to the Seventeenth Amendment, it would be odd for a
constitutional amendment that was intended to provide greater democratic
representation in regular Senate terms to have the effect of reducing
democratic representation following vacancies in the Senate. Given its
history and purpose, one might be inclined to construe the Seventeenth
Amendment in a way that shortened, or at least did not lengthen, the
maximum term for appointments.121 On this theory, even though the

4 ANNALS OF CONG. 77–78 (1794) (rejecting an appointment because the legislature was in session);
HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 20, at 59–63 (noting that in the 1890s the Senate refused
to seat five members appointed by governors after their legislatures failed to select replacements).
118
See CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 2208–11 (1854) (concluding that an appointment
expired at the conclusion of the legislative session following the appointment); CUSHING, supra note
62, ¶ 494, at 199–200; HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 19, at 163 & nn.2–3.
119
In the Convention debate over Senate vacancies, Edmund Randolph expressed concern that
“[i]n some States the Legislatures meet but once a year.” MADISON, supra note 16, at 363. Many
original state constitutions also required annual meetings by the legislature. E.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776,
art. XXVII; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. II; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VII;
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. II; N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. XV–XVI; PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 9; VT.
CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § VIII.
120
Relying on a U.S. Senate record, the lower court in Valenti v. Rockefeller concluded that 32 of
the 179 senatorial appointments that took place according to the terms of the unamended Constitution
had lasted longer than a year. 292 F. Supp. 851, 864 & n.20 (W.D.N.Y. 1968) (citing GORDON F.
HARRISON & JOHN P. CODER, SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 90-1, at 661–725 (1967)), aff’d, 393 U.S.
405 (1969) (per curiam). With the aid of modern technology and more accurate sources, this Senate
document was cross-referenced with additional materials (including S. DOC. NO. 58-11, at 146–55) to
find that twenty-one pre-Amendment appointees served more than a year before the legislature selected
a permanent replacement.
In any event, the Valenti majority used its finding to sanction a twenty-nine-month vacancy. Yet the
historical record establishes that legislative selections were delayed more than a year only twenty-one
times—just 11% of cases—and only one appointee served that long in the first fifty years after the
Constitution was ratified. Furthermore, while the Valenti court was correct that the longest appointed
term before the Seventeenth Amendment was nineteen months, it is not insignificant that this vacancy
happened during the Civil War, and in particular during a period when the Senator’s home state of
Missouri was divided between two competing and dysfunctional legislatures—the state became a
member of the Union and the Confederacy at once, and generally was preoccupied with its role in the
war and not the timely selection of a replacement senator.
121
Tucker also envisioned a system where vacancy elections would be held within a year:
In some states . . . in which there are annual elections, this would be a hardship, for the vacancy
would in most cases not be of long duration, and to add another State election would be imposing
an unnecessary expense on the people, so that the proviso was thought to be wise by which the
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Seventeenth Amendment does not include any expressly time-limiting
language, “temporary” could be understood to mean that a governor
empowered to appoint a replacement senator may select any qualified
individual to serve until the election to fill the vacancy takes place, but not
for longer than the one year imagined at the Framing.122
4.

The State Legislature’s Power to Direct Elections

. . . as the legislature may direct.
The proviso (and thus the second paragraph of the Seventeenth
Amendment) concludes with a return to the theme of state control over
congressional elections. The proviso calls for an election to follow an
appointment and reminds the reader that this election is a creature of state
law.123 “[A]s the legislature may direct” thus links up to the rule in the
Elections Clause that requires states to establish election regulations. The
legislative history discussed above shows that a main point of contention
was whether federal oversight of elections should be removed—there was

governor may be empowered to fill the vacancy “until the people fill the vacancy by election, as
the legislature may direct.”
. . . [I]n a State where there are biennial elections the legislature might direct that if a vacancy
occurred within a year [or any other period it might fix] after the election, the vacancy should be
filled by an election by the people; but if the vacancy occurred more than a year after the election
the vacancy should be filled by executive appointment . . . .
H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 5 (1892) (accompanying H.R. Res. 90, 52d Cong. (1892)) (alteration in
original).
122
There are at least two other potential bases for timing principles. First, around the turn of the
twentieth century, when the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted, there was a trend toward state
legislatures convening every two years. By 1906, only six state legislatures met each year. See R.
Newton Crane, United States of America—State Legislation, 8 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 274, 274–75
(1907); see also Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 864. So, at the time of the ratification of the Amendment, state
practice would have permitted an appointee to serve for two years.
Second, because the original Constitution gave the legislature one opportunity to fill the vacancy,
the Seventeenth Amendment could be read to allow an appointment to last through the state’s next
election. From that point of view, a state would only violate the Seventeenth Amendment if it allowed a
statewide election to pass without electing a replacement senator. One objection to this measure is that
it treats cases differently based on the timing of the vacancy. Imagine a state that holds statewide
elections only in even-numbered Novembers, i.e., when electing members of the House of
Representatives. Under this interpretation of the second paragraph, the state would only be required to
hold a vacancy-filling election if a Senate seat were vacant (or filled by an appointee) on one of those
election days. In a state like this, if a senator died or left office in October of an even-numbered year,
the people of the state would elect her replacement within one month, but if the senator died or left
office in December of an even-numbered year, the people would have to wait nearly two years for the
right to elect a replacement.
Part III of this Article, which reviews state practice under the Seventeenth Amendment, will address
all of these proposed measuring sticks.
123
For thoroughness, it should be noted that “as the legislature may direct” modifies “election,” the
last antecedent. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). It cannot modify the governor’s duty
to issue a writ of election. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 549 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The grammatical
acrobatics . . . are difficult to imagine.”).
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no serious discussion about removing the state legislatures’ obligation to
promulgate election regulations. The final clause of the proviso is thus
coextensive with the Election Clause’s directive that the state legislatures
should pass laws governing the time, place, and manner of congressional
elections. Its appearance at the end of the Seventeenth Amendment simply
reminds the reader that the states’ obligation to regulate elections extends
to the context of vacancy elections as well.
So understood, the final phrase of the proviso fits neatly within the
discussion thus far. As discussed above, the proviso places a condition on
the principal clause (rather than providing an alternative). The governor is
directed by the principal clause to issue a writ of election when a vacancy
happens. Nothing about the state legislature’s power can interfere with that
constitutional duty. Instead, the two branches of government work together:
where the legislature establishes a date for the election, the governor issues
the writ to make sure that election happens; where the legislature has not
set a date, the governor’s writ schedules the election, too. This balance of
power between legislature and executive as far as the details of the vacancy
election are concerned is complemented by a similar balance of authority
on the subject of temporary appointments. The legislature decides whether
such appointments may occur, and if it approves the appointment power,
the governor may appoint a replacement until the election happens. This
system should prevent the branches of state government from colluding to
appoint a replacement senator for too long. Through this mechanism, the
question whether states wish to retain their equal suffrage in the Senate is
left to their discretion, but in all instances, vacancies in the Senate must be
filled by the people themselves.
III. STATE PRACTICE AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Seventeenth Amendment demonstrates a clear constitutional
preference for the democratic selection of senators. This guiding principle
applies to regular elections conducted according to the Amendment’s first
paragraph, and it is central to the vacancy-filling procedure outlined in the
second paragraph. This Part turns to state practice under the Seventeenth
Amendment. Since 1913, there has been no case when a state has ignored
the first paragraph’s command to elect senators to six-year terms by
popular vote. Efforts to fill vacancies in states’ senatorial delegations,
however, tell a different story. Having compiled a dataset of all vacancies
that have happened since the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified,124 this
124

This Article does not address how the Seventeenth Amendment affects the composition and
behavior of the Senate. The political science literature has found that: directly elected senators are more
responsive to and reflective of the general electorate, the Senate’s composition is less dynastic and
aristocratic and reflects faster turnover, the composition of state legislatures became less important in
senators’ reelection decisions, the Amendment did not make it more likely that progressive reforms
would pass, and direct election made senators more responsive to the public but also gave them more
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Part shows that state practice repeatedly runs afoul of both the explicit
terms and the spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment’s second paragraph.
A. Senate Vacancy Data
To assess state compliance with the Seventeenth Amendment, data
were collected on every vacancy in the U.S. Senate since the Amendment
was adopted through the November 2012 general election.125 This effort is
produced in two appendices.126 Using records maintained by Congress,127

discretion to pursue their own agendas (the public monitors them less than state legislatures did). See
William Bernhard & Brian R. Sala, The Remaking of an American Senate: The 17th Amendment and
Ideological Responsiveness, 68 J. POL. 345 (2006); Sara Brandes Crook & John R. Hibbing, A Not-SoDistant Mirror: The 17th Amendment and Congressional Change, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845 (1997);
Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the
Senate, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 324 (2009); Scott R. Meinke, Institutional Change and the Electoral
Connection in the Senate: Revisiting the Effects of Direct Election, 61 POL. RES. Q. 445 (2008);
Francine Sanders Romero, The Impact of Direct Election on Reform Votes in the U.S. Senate, 88 SOC.
SCI. Q. 816 (2007). Senate historian George Haynes recognized that studying the Senate before and
after the Seventeenth Amendment would be important. In 1914, he published a review of the last class
of legislatively elected senators explicitly as a resource for future researchers. George H. Haynes, The
Changing Senate, 200 N. AM. REV. 222 (1914).
125
The Seventeenth Amendment was in force as of May 31, 1913, see 38 Stat. 2049–50 (1913),
and these data are limited to vacancies occurring after that date. This approach adheres to the
Amendment’s third paragraph: “This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or
term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII (emphasis added); see also Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, 63d Cong.
(1913) (construing the Amendment in light of a seat that became vacant before ratification and was
filled after ratification). These data include the seven senators filling Senate vacancies as of the
November 2012 general election. These senators present a bit of a moving target. Each is treated as if
she will serve until the last day of her current term in the same capacity in which she currently serves: it
is assumed that the six who have been elected to fill vacancies (Barrasso, Brown, Coons, Gillibrand,
Manchin, and Wicker) will continue as elected replacements, and that Senator Heller, the only
appointee serving today, will continue as an appointee. This study does not include any vacancies
created after the November 2012 general election.
126
See Apps. A & B.
127
Data are drawn from the Congressional Record and the following sources: BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774–PRESENT, http://bioguide.congress.gov (last
visited May 13, 2013); Senate Historical Office, Senators of the United States, 1789–2012 (2013),
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/chronlist.pdf; Appointed Senators, U.S.
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_appointed.htm (last
visited May 13, 2013); Contested Senate Elections, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/contested_elections/intro.htm (last visited May 13, 2013); Senate State Information,
U.S. SENATE, http://senate.gov/pagelayout/senators/f_two_sections_with_teasers/states.htm (last visited
May 13, 2013); Senators who Have Died in Office, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
history/four_column_table/SenatorsDiedinOffice.shtml (last visited May 13, 2013). This dataset differs
from these congressional publications. For instance, the Senate data exclude so-called technical
resignations, where a senator resigns after her successor is elected. See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40421, FILLING U.S. SENATE VACANCIES: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY
DEVELOPMENTS 7 (2009). For completeness, these resignations are counted as vacancies and included
in the dataset.
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every vacancy during the relevant timeframe was identified,128 and then
biographical information about all senators who created or served as
replacements during the vacancy was cataloged.129 In addition, calculations
were made for the length of time the seat was empty at the start of the
vacancy, the time served by appointees and elected replacements, and the
total time during the vacancy that the people were without elected
representation. Finally, each vacancy was coded to correspond to the type
of senator who created the vacancy, how it was created, and the way in
which it was filled.130
B. An Overview of Senate Vacancies
There have been 244 vacancies in the U.S. Senate since the adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment. These vacancies have been spread evenly
across the states for the most part, and there has been a decline in the rate
of vacancies over time. There have been a total of 170 elections to fill
Senate vacancies. In the same period, state executives have made 234
appointments to the Senate.131 In fact, almost one-third of all senators who
have taken office since the adoption of the Amendment first arrived in the
Senate as appointees.132

128

Counting vacancies requires some thought. Some cases are easy: a regularly elected senator
who dies in office always creates a vacancy. As mentioned above, vacancies before May 31, 1913, are
not counted, while the dataset includes those that happen after technical resignations and similar events
creating vacancies at the tail end of a Senate term. As explained in Part II, vacancies occur in those
instances where the Senate is unable or unwilling to seat a senator—where the would-be senator dies
before the term begins, see App. B, Nos. 114 (Carnahan), 130 (Pittman), and 243 (Thomson), or where
the Senate rejects the senator, id. Nos. 57 (Smith), 141 (Wyman and Durkin), and 190 (Vare). Finally,
when an appointed senator leaves office early, this is not treated as a new vacancy; if the sitting senator
has been replaced in an election to fill the vacancy, however, the elected replacement leaving office
does create a new vacancy. This rule reflects the view that the process required by the Seventeenth
Amendment is complete once an elected replacement takes office.
129
This Part refers to “full terms,” “unexpired terms,” and “short terms.” See generally ROBERT
DOVE, THE TERM OF A SENATOR—WHEN DOES IT BEGIN AND END?, S. DOC. NO. 98-29, at 1 (1984). A
full term is the six-year term of a Senate seat. An unexpired term is the balance of a term remaining
when a vacancy happens. Finally, where a senator leaves office between the regular November election
for the new term and the end of the current term (during the lame-duck session), the unexpired term is
referred to as a short term.
130
A detailed explanation of the coding is found in App. A.
131
On twelve occasions, a senator who was appointed to fill a vacancy left the Senate before the
end of the unexpired term and the state executive selected a second appointee as a replacement. This
means there are twelve fewer vacancies filled by appointment than the total number of appointments. In
addition, the total number of appointments is not the same as the total number of people appointed. Five
people were appointed twice, see App. B, Nos. 47 & 53 (Thomas), 129 & 130 (Bunker), 173 & 178
(Metzenbaum), 181 & 182 (McNary), and 209 & 212 (Blakley), which means that a total of 229
different people have been appointed to the Senate under the Seventeenth Amendment.
132
The Senate Historical Office’s publication, see Senators of the United States, supra note 127, at
53–89, lists 813 individuals who took office in the Senate for the first time after the passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment. Of these 813 senators, 227 or 28% first took their seats as appointees (2 of
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These initial observations include so-called technical vacancies—
vacancies that happen when a senator leaves office after the regular
election for the next term of her seat.133 There have been forty-four
technical vacancies in this period.134 While the Seventeenth Amendment
applies to these cases, all technical vacancies have been excluded from this
Part’s consideration of state compliance. As a practical matter, technical
vacancies are quite short, occurring with twenty days left in the term on
average. Even if a state could hold an election during this short term,135 the
harm of losing a few days of elected representation at the end of a lameduck session of Congress may not be worth the considerable cost of the
vacancy election.136 And since the vast majority of these technical
vacancies are filled by appointing a senator-elect, the people usually end up
represented by a person they have just elected.137 As a result, while
the 229 people appointed since 1913—Henry Dworshak and Norris Cotton—served as elected senators
prior to their appointments).
133
The vacancy occurs during the “short term.” See supra note 129.
134
Thirty-four of these forty-four occurred because of technical resignations, where the sitting
senator resigned and the senator-elect took over just before the start of the term for which she was
elected. In part, this was done to give the senator-elect an advantage in seniority in the next Congress.
See, e.g., Stephen H. Balch, Getting that Extra Edge: Seniority & Early Appointments to the United
States Senate, 11 POLITY 138, 138–40 (1978). According to the Senate Historical Office, the Rules
Committee stopped granting seniority in these cases beginning in 1980. See Senators of the United
States, supra note 127, at 81 n.8. The remaining nine technical vacancies were resolved as follows: one
senator who resigned during a short term was replaced by a person other than the senator-elect, App. B,
No. 20 (McAdoo and Storke); three senators resigned during a short term and their seats were never
filled, id. Nos. 14 (Fulbright), 86 (Brewster), and 165 (Ervin); and six senators died during a short
term—two were replaced by the senator-elect, id. Nos. 54 (McCormick and Deneen) and 97 (Hart and
Riegle), three were replaced by someone other than the senator-elect, id. Nos. 129 (Pittman and
Bunker), 199 (Smith and Hall), and 230 (Jones and Grammer), and one vacancy was left unfilled
because the putative appointee was never seated in the Senate, id. No. 56 (McKinley). See also infra
Part IV.A (discussing state laws in Oklahoma and Connecticut that limit appointments to the short
terms).
135
It would be difficult to do so in some cases. And even if a state could hold such an election, it
would be almost impossible to challenge its refusal to do so—the time between early November’s
general election and the next January 3 does not give an aggrieved party time to prosecute a lawsuit.
136
This does not imply that the harm caused by the loss of representation during the lame-duck
session of Congress is de minimis. Accord Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 556 (7th Cir. 2010). Elections
to fill vacancies should be held on the same day as the regular election for the next term. This is what
Illinois did following the Obama vacancy, and it has happened on forty different occasions since
1913—in almost a quarter of all the elections held to fill vacancies. However, when a vacancy occurs
after the general election for the next term, the cost–benefit analysis shifts dramatically. An effort to
start a whole new election cycle—which would include nominating candidates, a statewide election,
and a certification period—right after a general election would present serious difficulties. The
Amendment’s framers also recognized the significant obstacles in such circumstances. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. NO. 52-368, at 5 (1892) (accompanying H.R. Res. 90, 52d Cong. (1892)) (report of Rep. Tucker)
(commenting on the “hardship” and “unnecessary expense” of a special election too close to a general
election).
137
The senator-elect filled thirty-six of forty-four technical vacancies. See supra note 134. As
discussed above, this early transfer of power was often intentional. Strict enforcement of the
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technical vacancies are reported in the appendices, they are excluded in the
following analysis of state practice.
This leaves 200 Senate vacancies between the adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment and the present day. To begin with some basic
observations, more than 70% of these vacancies were caused by the death
of a sitting senator, with nearly all the rest caused by a senator’s
resignation.138 In 182 of the 200 cases, the vacancy was first filled by a state
executive appointing a replacement, and in 152 of those cases, the
appointment was followed by an election to fill the balance of the term. In
only 18 cases did the state hold an election to fill a vacancy without first
appointing a replacement senator. The result is that the people ultimately
filled 170 of these 200 vacancies. The converse, of course, is that there
have been 30 instances in which the state executive appointed a permanent
replacement to the Senate and the state failed to hold any election to fill the
vacancy. Of the 200 vacancies of interest, no state has ever left any of them
empty for the balance of the unexpired term.
Vacancies in the Senate have resulted in a total of 568 years’ worth of
unexpired terms since 1913.139 To put this figure another way, at any given
moment, one could expect 6 of the 100 Senate seats to be vacant or filled
by senators appointed or elected to fill a vacancy.140 Moreover, of the 568
years to which the terms of the second paragraph of the Seventeenth
Amendment ought to apply, the people have been without elected
representation a total of 193 years, or one-third of the time. The vast
majority of this 193-year figure is comprised of the service of senators
appointed by state executives.141
A final issue is the states’ immediate responses to vacancies in their
Senate delegations. States tend to fill empty seats with great speed. As
explained already, no state has ever left a seat empty for a whole unexpired
term. The average time a seat is left empty after a vacancy happens is an
incredibly short twenty-five days.142 In the last fifty years, states have filled
Seventeenth Amendment during a short term likely would lead to fewer technical resignations, rather
than a greater number of elections to fill technical vacancies.
138
Deaths caused 142 out of 200 vacancies, and resignation caused 55. All three vacancies not
caused by death or resignation were created when the Senate refused to seat anyone. See App. B, Nos.
57 (Smith), 141 (Wyman and Durkin), and 190 (Vare). Since the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment, no vacancy has been caused by expulsion.
139
Accounting for all 200 vacancies, the total time between creation of the vacancy and the end of
the term is 207,379 days.
140
On average, 5.79% of seats are tied up in some phase of the process outlined in the
Amendment’s second paragraph.
141
Appointees served 178 of the 193 years (accounting for all 200 vacancies, the total time
appointees served is 64,716 days). In other words, the appointees served 31% of all unexpired terms.
The remainder corresponds to time that seats were empty before a replacement senator was appointed or
elected (accounting for all 200 vacancies, the total time seats were left empty is 5086 days).
142
Seats have been empty for a total of 14 of the 568 years of total unexpired terms, or just 2.5%.
Only two seats have been left open more than six months, and the longest any seat was empty is ten
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vacancies in just two weeks on average. The speed with which the states
act should come as no surprise, given the persistent concern about equal
suffrage in the Senate. In this connection, note that the time a seat is left
empty corresponds to whether it is first filled by an election or by an
executive appointment: when there is an election to fill a vacancy with no
intervening appointment, the seat remains empty for four months on
average,143 but when the seat is filled first by an appointment, it is empty
only sixteen days. This discrepancy makes sense; while governors can
make temporary appointments with the stroke of a pen, a state’s electoral
processes take more time to operate. That said, there may be other reasons
for this discrepancy, a subject to which this Article will return shortly.
C. Facial Noncompliance
States violate the Seventeenth Amendment’s explicit terms when they
fail to hold elections to fill vacant seats. Such blatant violations are referred
to here as “facial noncompliance.”144
The frequency of facial noncompliance over the past 100 years is
striking. In that period, state executives have appointed a permanent
replacement to serve the entire unexpired term in 30 of the 200 Senate
vacancies.145 This means that in one-sixth of all vacancies, the states have
failed to hold the election required by the Seventeenth Amendment.
Vacancies have been filled by permanent appointments nearly twice as
often as they have been filled by an election without any intervening
appointment.146 This pattern represents persistent disobedience of a core
constitutional voting right.
A permanent appointment necessarily means that the people have been
deprived of elected representation in the Senate.147 Although permanent
appointees typically have been appointed quite quickly after a vacancy

months. See App. B, Nos. 3 (Johnston) and 57 (Smith). On the short end, in ten instances, a vacancy
was created and filled on the same day, and in twenty-two cases, a vacancy was filled on the day after it
was created.
143
The average time the seat is left empty in these cases is 119 days. The delay before filling the
seat does not always last that long. A senator could choose, for example, to wait to resign until a
replacement is elected. This happened when Senator Boren announced his plan to resign to become
President of the University of Oklahoma in 1994. He said he would wait to leave office until a
successor was elected. Although this chain of events may present some formal concerns, it resulted in
just two days between Senator Boren’s resignation and his elected replacement’s start date. See App. B,
No. 180; see also infra note 196.
144
A state also would fail to comply facially by failing to hold an election for the full term, but this
has never happened.
145
Recall that “technical vacancies” that occur near the end of a term are excluded. See supra notes
133–37 and accompanying text.
146
States filled vacancies with no intervening appointment eighteen times.
147
As a result of facial noncompliance, the people have been deprived of thirty-six years of elected
representation in the Senate (13,041 days for all thirty vacancies).
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happened, the average time that a state went without elected representation
was more than fourteen months in cases where states disobeyed the
Seventeenth Amendment on its face. In sixteen cases, facial noncompliance
caused gaps in elected representation of a year or more,148 and in five
instances, the deprivation lasted more than two years.149
One of the most extreme examples of facial noncompliance occurred
in connection with Senator Robert Kennedy’s vacancy, which was the
subject of Valenti v. Rockefeller.150 New York never held an election to fill
the Kennedy vacancy, and the appointed replacement served the remainder
of the term.151 The people of New York went without elected representation
for two years and seven months.152 In 1964, when Hubert Humphrey
resigned from the Senate to become Vice President, Walter Mondale was
appointed to his seat and served for the entire term without being elected,
leaving Minnesotans without elected representation for over two years.153
When Senator Mondale later left the Senate to become Vice President, two
appointees served for the remainder of the vacancy. The state did not hold
an election and the people were again without elected representation for
two years.154 The most extreme deprivation occurred in Maine, where the
governor appointed George Mitchell to serve for most of a two-year-andeight-month vacancy.155 In a recent case of facial noncompliance, Frank
Murkowski resigned as senator from Alaska in 2002 to become that state’s
governor and appointed his daughter, Lisa Murkowski, to fill his seat.156
148

See App. B, Nos. 8 (Murkowski), 10 (Miller), 11 (McClellan), 26 (Salazar), 40 (Martinez), 87
(Muskie), 105 (Humphrey), 106 (Mondale), 112 (Truman), 125 (Zorinsky), 131 (Scrugham), 132
(Ensign), 156 (Kennedy), 178 (Saxbe), 193 (Chafee), and 228 (Wallgren).
149
See id. Nos. 8 (Murkowski), 87 (Muskie), 105 (Humphrey), 106 (Mondale), and 156 (Kennedy).
150
292 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969) (per curiam).
151
See 116 CONG. REC. 44,576–77 (1971) (Goodell’s last day); 117 CONG. REC. 3 (1971)
(certificate for replacement dated January 3). This fact seems to have escaped scholars writing about
Valenti. It is especially strange because the Valenti court agreed with the conclusion that permanent
appointments violate the Seventeenth Amendment: “We would have difficulty, for example, squaring
the word ‘temporary’ with a statute providing that the Governor’s appointee is to serve out the
remainder of a term regardless of its length.” 292 F. Supp. at 856. But this is exactly what happened.
152
See App. B, No. 156. The seat was left empty for 96 days, and Goodell served for 845 days.
153
See id. No. 105. Mondale served as an appointee for 734 days.
154
See id. No. 106. The replacements for Mondale served a total of 733 days. One interpretation of
the second paragraph requires states to fill vacancies by election at the next statewide election. See
supra note 122. In the case of the Mondale vacancy (and the Kennedy vacancy, supra note 152), not
one but two statewide elections passed without the state electing a replacement.
155
See App. B, No. 87. Senator Mitchell served as an appointee for 959 days.
156
Unfortunately, family connections and scheming by state governors are common when it comes
to vacant seats. In at least eleven cases, the appointed replacement came from the same family as the
senator creating the vacancy. See id. Nos. 5 (Allen), 8 (Murkowski), 13 (Caraway), 82 (Long), 101
(Humphrey), 114 (Carnahan), 168 (Burdick), 193 (Chafee), 201 (Bushfield), 220 (Gibson), and 222
(Byrd). On two occasions, a state executive appointed his own wife to a vacant seat, id. Nos. 4 (Dixie
Bibb Graves) and 83 (Elaine Edwards), and once an executive appointed his own daughter, id. No. 8
(Murkowski). Perhaps worse, ten times a governor appointed himself to the Senate. Id. Nos. 48
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She served as a permanent appointee through the end of the term more than
two years later.157
There is considerable variance in facial noncompliance over time. In
the first half century after the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified, there
were eleven vacancies filled by permanent appointees. Since 1963,
however, there have been nineteen cases. Importantly, there have been
roughly half as many vacancies in the Senate during the latter period as
there were during the earlier one.158 Thus, facial noncompliance occurred in
7% of vacancies during the first half century after adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment and in 25% of cases during the second half
century. And in the last decade, there have been three times as many
examples of facial noncompliance than during the first twenty-five years
that the Seventeenth Amendment was in force. In short, facial
noncompliance is becoming more common.
D. Election Delays and “Constructive Noncompliance”
The Seventeenth Amendment does not expressly require the states to
hold vacancy-filling elections within any particular time period. The delays
in holding elections, therefore, do not represent noncompliance of the
Amendment in the same sense as the failures to fill vacancies by election.
However, long delays seem to run counter to the Seventeenth
Amendment’s preference for democratically elected senators—during these
periods the Senate seats are filled by an unelected appointee or (far less
frequently) by no one at all. This section begins with a review of state
practice with respect to the scheduling of vacancy elections and then turns
to some observations about that record in light of various measures that
may be applied to Senate vacancies.
Putting aside the thirty cases of facial noncompliance discussed above,
the states filled the remaining 170 vacancies in one of two ways: they put a
temporary appointee in the Senate and then held an election to select a
permanent replacement, or they held an election to fill the vacancy without
any intervening appointee.159 Of these 170 vacancies ultimately filled by
election, the people were without elected representation for an average of

(Gossett), 74 (Chandler), 81 (Ford) (though Ford was appointed after a technical resignation), 106
(Anderson), 120 (Erickson), 131 (Carville), 152 (Mechem), 179 (Edmondson), 200 (Russell), and 243
(Hickey).
157
See id. No. 8. Lisa Murkowski served for 745 days as an appointee before starting a full term in
2005 for which she was elected.
158
One hundred sixty-four vacancies occurred during the first fifty years after adoption; seventynine have occurred since then.
159
As mentioned above, the states have chosen the appointment-then-election route in 152 cases
and the election-only route in 18.
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eleven months per vacancy.160 In the last century, this wait adds up to
almost 157 years without elected representation.161
One key variable predicting how long the people must wait for an
election to fill a Senate vacancy is whether the state appoints a temporary
replacement before holding the election. Senate seats are left empty for
four months on average when a state fills the vacancy by holding an
election without any appointment and for only sixteen days when an
appointed senator first fills the seat. This is a significant difference in the
amount of time the state goes without representation in the Senate, but time
without representation is only half the story. The Seventeenth
Amendment’s preference for elections means it is important to compare the
difference between how long the people are without elected representation
in each of these circumstances. The wait for an election is four months
when the seat is filled by election only (the same figure as above). But in
those cases where an appointee first fills the vacancy, the election does not
come for more than a year after the vacancy is created.162 The average wait
for elected representation is thus three times longer when an election is
preceded by an executive appointment.163 This is a difference that adds up:
if all vacancies were filled by an election alone without intervening
appointments, the people would have enjoyed an additional 100 years’
worth of elected representation.164
The disparity is evident in cases of extreme delay as well. All four
cases in which the people waited more than two years for an elected
replacement involved an interim appointment. One of these egregious
delays came in the case of the Obama vacancy, where the people of Illinois
waited more than two years for an elected replacement. Perhaps more
stunning than two-year-long delays is that the wait for an elected senator
lasted more than one year in sixty-five of the vacancies that followed the
appointment-then-election model, and lasted more than a year and a half in
twenty-two cases. In contrast, of those cases that were filled by election
160

In the 170 cases where states held elections, the average time to fill the seat by election was 336

days.

161

The total time without elected representation in these 170 cases is 57,159 days.
In the 18 instances where a vacancy was first filled by election, the average wait for an election
was 119 days. In the 152 cases where the vacancy was filled by an appointment followed by an
election, the average wait for an election was 362 days.
163
Put another way, when vacancies are filled by election without an appointment, an elected
senator represents the people for 89% of the unexpired term (the average time filled by an elected
senator is 995 days and the average time without elected representation is 119 days); but where an
appointee serves in advance of an election, only 68% of the unexpired term is filled by an elected
senator (the average time filled by an elected senator is 785 days and the average time without elected
representation is 362 days).
164
If the election had occurred within 119 days (the average wait for an election if there is no
appointment) in each of the 152 cases where a vacancy was filled by appointment then election, the
people would have lost out on only 18,088 days of representation. Instead, they lost out on 55,010 days
total—an additional 36,922 days.
162
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alone, none involved a wait longer than one year; in the vast majority of
these cases, the election was held within six months of the vacancy.
These data suggest that while states are quick to fill empty seats in the
Senate with appointees, they often let appointees linger in lieu of moving
expeditiously to elect permanent replacements. The disparity in the wait for
elected representation between cases where appointments happen and those
where they do not implies that the second paragraph’s appointment power,
which is intended to ensure the states’ equal suffrage, postpones the
popular elections guaranteed by the rest of the Seventeenth Amendment.
And the longer an unelected appointee serves, the more entrenched she
becomes—and presumably the larger the incumbency advantage she
enjoys.
What should be made of this record? A state’s failure to hold an
election is facial noncompliance, but to evaluate state practice with respect
to the timing of elections, there would need to be agreement about how
long a state may delay an election without offending the Seventeenth
Amendment. States cannot hold vacancy elections immediately after
vacancies are created;165 advocating for such a system could result in
inordinate costs and significant risks to the electoral process. But giving a
state free reign, approaching the full six years of a term (should
circumstances permit), seems at odds with the Amendment’s purpose.
The history of the Seventeenth Amendment suggests a few ways to
think about how long a wait for a vacancy election is too long.166 Part II
suggested that the prehistory of the Seventeenth Amendment provided
some support to limiting gubernatorial appointments to one year. There are
also historical reasons to think that a two-year measure would be
appropriate.167 Applying the more generous measure, according to which
165

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Another option is drawn from the data. The average time without elected representation is four
months when a state holds an election to fill a vacancy without an intervening appointment. (The
median is slightly lower than the mean, 111 days.) One could argue that any delay longer than four
months runs afoul of the spirit of the Amendment. According to that measure, 82% of all vacancies
filled by an election since 1913 have been unreasonably long. See App. B. And many state laws
requiring special elections to fill Senate vacancies set those elections within four months. See infra note
190. But four months is a strict measure for constitutional compliance, and admittedly there are cases in
which the state held an election without an appointment (where the state should be motivated to hold an
election quickly), and the delay before the election was more than four months.
167
See supra Part II.C.3. Part II also discussed an interpretation of the second paragraph that only
requires states to fill vacancies at the next statewide election. See supra note 122. Applying this limit,
the thirty cases of facial noncompliance necessarily qualify since facial noncompliance means that the
appointee completed the term (having excluded those cases where the seat became vacant after the
election for the new term). There are an additional three cases in which an appointee was serving on the
November election day in an even-numbered year (i.e., when voters in all states would vote for
members of Congress). See App. B, Nos. 29, 104, and 168. This brings the total to thirty-four cases, but
there are reasons to believe this analysis understates the total. First, some states hold regular off-year
elections. For example, five states currently elect their governors in odd years: Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia. Including statewide gubernatorial elections from these states
166
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anything longer than a two-year wait for an election would be
unreasonable, the states waited too long to hold an election on just four
occasions.168 Not bad at all given that there have been a total of 170
vacancies filled by election. But this measure countenances an unelected
appointee serving a full third of a Senate term.
One year, on the other hand, is enough time to allow the electoral
machinery of the states to function in a deliberative fashion, and it has
some basis in the original understanding of the Constitution and the
legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment.169 Some states currently
hold statewide general elections every year, suggesting that the burden of
holding a vacancy election within this interval would not be prohibitive.170
Applying this standard, the election was delayed too long in 65 of the 170
vacancies filled by election. One could say, therefore, that in approximately
40% of cases, the states unreasonably delayed elections to fill vacancies
and thus violated the democratic spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment.
E. Comments on State Practice
The second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment balances the
people’s right to popular elections with the states’ right to equal suffrage in
the Senate. The states have had little trouble making sure the latter goal is
served: all 200 vacancies were filled (quickly on average), and in 9 of
every 10 cases an executive appointee first filled the vacant seat. In
addition, states generally hold the required popular elections—senators
have been elected by popular vote every two years since 1913, and in 85%
of all Senate vacancies, permanent replacements have been elected by
popular vote.
Despite this success, reliance on the Amendment’s appointment power
has come at the cost of the primary goal of directly electing senators. A
permanent appointee serves the entire unexpired term in one-sixth of all
Senate vacancies, a facial violation of the Seventeenth Amendment.
Furthermore, when states do hold elections, they often appoint a
replacement for a substantial period before the election. The states’

alone, there are three additional cases where a state violated this interpretation of the Amendment. See
id. Nos. 74, 76, and 141. Moreover, there are countless other statewide votes at times other than in the
November of an even-numbered year (constitutional amendments, recalls, initiatives, and other
statewide offices), and these irregular elections are not accounted for in this analysis.
168
See id. Nos. 59 (Obama, 743 days), 90 (Lodge, 757 days), 104 (Lundeen, 809 days), and 159
(Bailey, 747 days).
169
See supra Part II.C.3.
170
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:2-3 (West 1999) (“The general election shall be held on the Tuesday
next after the first Monday in November in each year.” (emphasis added)); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2208, -210, -214 (2011) (providing for some statewide elections every year).
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ordering of priorities—filling vacancies quickly while sometimes delaying
elections—is contrary to the purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment.171
A literature too vast to collect here identifies the struggle in different
areas of federal constitutional law between the states and the federal
government.172 Historically, the states’ systematic violations of the
Constitution have prompted strong enforcement measures by the national
government and the Supreme Court.173 Moreover, routine violations of
171

Despite these comments, the Seventeenth Amendment’s appointment power has not been all
bad. There is an argument that the Seventeenth Amendment and its appointment provision played a role
in opening the Senate to women. Nine of the first thirteen women to serve in the Senate arrived there as
gubernatorial appointees. The first, Rebecca Felton, was appointed by a governor looking to score
political points after he opposed the Nineteenth Amendment. That governor never expected Felton to
take her Senate seat because the time remaining in the term was too short. He was wrong, however, and
Felton was sworn in for twenty-four hours of service. John E. Talmadge, The Seating of the First
Woman in the United States Senate, 10 GA. REV. 168, 172–73 (1956). There is also evidence that the
Seventeenth Amendment helped to acclimate the general population to the idea of women serving in the
Senate: the first woman to win a Senate election, Hattie Caraway, had been previously appointed, and
two of the first women who won Senate elections did so in elections to fill very short vacancies. See
App. B, No. 13. Scholars and historians have shown that the Progressive Movement and the struggle for
the Nineteenth Amendment were essential to the women’s suffrage movement and the appearance of
women in elected office, but it appears that scholars have not examined the role that the Seventeenth
Amendment played in this social evolution.
Women were not the only group to benefit from the Amendment. The first Hispanic senator,
Octaviano Larrazolo, entered the Senate after winning an election to fill a vacancy, and the second,
Dennis Chavez, joined as an appointee. See id. Nos. 150–51. The first Asian-American senator from the
lower forty-eight states, S.I. Hayakawa, was also an appointee. See id. No. 18.
172
For a starting point, see Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501
(2008) (surveying state court defiance of Supreme Court precedent), and Caitlin E. Borgmann,
Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753 (2006) (discussing
states chilling certain constitutionally protected conduct by granting private rights of action against that
conduct).
173
Consider, for example, Congress’s effort to remedy violations of the Fifteenth Amendment with
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), discussed in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309
(1966). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (defining Congress’s enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The VRA’s preclearance requirement, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b (2006), is a particularly good example of Congress using broad means to deal with a history of
constitutional defiance. Another example is the Supreme Court and federal government responses to the
states’ resistance to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally CHARLES J.
OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED (2004); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (per curiam) (recognizing that district courts have “broad power” to require
compliance with Brown); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (per curiam) (rejecting state
nullification of the Court’s decision in Brown and requiring state officials to obey it).
The Supreme Court has taken steps in a number of other areas to remove the states’ ability to
infringe upon constitutional rights. E.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (ordering California to
reduce its prison population to comply with the Eighth Amendment); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969) (dealing with the problem of vindictive sentencing following successful appeals by
imposing prophylactic requirements on state judges); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657–58 (1961)
(noting that its decision to apply the exclusionary rule to the states would discourage “disobedience to
the Federal Constitution”); see also, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975) (discussing and justifying
“substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not
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federal constitutional rights typically result in ample private efforts to
enforce compliance.174 In the context of the Seventeenth Amendment,
however, there has been little response. There has been minimal effort from
Congress or the courts to remedy violations of the Seventeenth
Amendment, and there have been few lawsuits to enforce its terms. This is
particularly concerning given the observation that facial noncompliance
with the Seventeenth Amendment is on the rise. Indeed, in the spate of
vacancies that have happened since the Obama election, the rate of facial
noncompliance is even higher than in earlier times.175

required by, various constitutional provisions”). In Monroe v. Pape, the Court remarked that
Section 1983 provided a federal remedy for civil rights violations because “state laws might not be
enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.” 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). The
Court has also established categorical rules holding the death penalty unconstitutional for certain classes
of crimes, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (child rape); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (rape), as well as certain classes of people, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (people of limited mental capacity).
Of course, not all state defiance of the Constitution provokes such an aggressive response. E.g.,
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989) (holding that the Due
Process Clause does not place an affirmative obligation on states). Indeed, the doctrine of harmless
error acknowledges that some constitutional errors should be tolerated. See generally Harry T. Edwards,
To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1167 (1995). But see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–50 (2006) (discussing
and cataloging structural errors).
174
Consider the huge amount of Second Amendment litigation following District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Ezell v. City of
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc),
or the high frequency of Eighth Amendment claims by inmates or Takings Clause litigation by property
owners.
175
There have been eight vacancies since the 2008 election. Five states held elections to fill these
vacancies; three did not. Illinois held an election, but only in response to a federal court order. Delaware
held an election after Senator Biden resigned to become Vice President, and New York did the same to
replace Hillary Clinton, who became Secretary of State. The people of Delaware and New York waited
nearly two years for elected replacements. See App. B, Nos. 34 (Biden vacancy, 669 days) and 157
(Clinton vacancy, 650 days). The two other states to hold elections to fill vacancies were Massachusetts
and West Virginia. When Senator Kennedy died in August 2009, Massachusetts law required the
governor to schedule an election immediately, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 140(a)–(c) (LexisNexis
2006 & Supp. 2013), and Governor Patrick chose a date in January 2010. At the same time, the
Massachusetts legislature passed a law permitting the governor to make a temporary appointment. 2009
Mass. Acts 715 (codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 140(f)). The final vacancy in the compliant
group occurred when Senator Byrd died, leaving the West Virginia seat vacant. The rollercoaster effort
to comply with the Seventeenth Amendment in that case is described above. See supra notes 64–67 and
accompanying text.
The noncompliant states are Florida, Colorado, and Nevada. Senator Martinez of Florida announced
his retirement in August 2009. Though Florida law provided that “the Governor shall issue a writ of
election to fill such vacancy at the next general election,” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2008),
Florida never held an election to fill the vacancy. Instead, an appointee served the remainder of the
unexpired term. Colorado similarly appointed a replacement to serve in Senator Salazar’s place when he
joined the Obama Administration but never held a vacancy election. Nevada was also represented by an
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Before moving on, it is necessary to address one potential qualification
of the foregoing analysis. Recall that states wait an average of four months
for a new senator when they hold an election without an interim
appointment. If a senator is first appointed, the seat is filled almost
immediately, though the people wait twelve months on average for elected
representation. Critics of the emphasis on elections may ask, therefore,
whether it is better to be without any representation for four months or
without elected representation for twelve. This question pits sovereign
equality in the Senate against the popular election of senators. But, happily,
the states need not choose between these values. As stressed throughout,
the Seventeenth Amendment is designed to serve both values. The timing
of elections is a matter of state law, and there is no reason a state could not
choose to empower the governor to make a temporary appointment and
require, in all circumstances, an election within a reasonable period.
IV. STATE LAW AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES
State law has produced the record of state practice described above,
but it also represents an important target for reform. While some members
of Congress and commentators have called for revision of the Seventeenth
Amendment itself,176 this is an ill-advised course of action. The
Seventeenth Amendment represents a carefully designed mechanism for
filling vacancies, which guarantees popular elections as a primary matter
and also provides for temporary measures that ensure equal state
representation in the Senate. That the states have abused the appointment
power and delayed elections is no reason to abandon the well-conceived
constitutional design. On the contrary, the problem is best solved by
changing state behavior through state law.
It is true that the Elections Clause empowers the federal government to
intervene in the regulation of elections, and it may be that federal
intervention becomes necessary in this case. But there are reasons to give
states the first opportunity to remedy this problem of their own making. For
one thing, political will (or lack thereof) supports a state-level response.
Whatever coalition of forces would oppose reform proposals in the state
legislatures, in Congress these interests would be augmented by those
members who oppose increased federal intervention generally or federal

appointed senator who served the balance of the term as an appointee before being elected to the next
Congress.
176
See, e.g., S.J. Res. 7, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed constitutional amendment eliminating
appointments); A Constitutional Amendment Concerning Senate Vacancies: Joint Hearing on S.J. Res.
7 & H.R.J. Res. 21 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary & the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 25 (2009) (debating these issues); Shedd, supra note 7 (proposing a constitutional amendment);
REPEAL THE 17TH AMENDMENT, http://repealthe17thamendment.blogspot.com (last visited May 15,
2013).
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intervention in elections specifically. Furthermore, as described above, one
aspect of the Seventeenth Amendment’s bargain was the decision to leave
the states as the primary regulators of senatorial elections.177 Although this
division of labor is not absolute (or wholly justified), if one were inclined
to pick a fight about state control of national elections, it would not be on
this issue, which tends to affect states individually and infrequently.
Instead, in keeping with the approach that the framers of the Elections
Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment imagined, advocates for change in
the practice of filling vacancies should permit the states to address this
problem in the first instance. Unless and until the states are presented with
the problem directly and decline to act, the state-level fix should not be
rejected out of hand. While state laws governing vacancy elections are
responsible for the lapses in state practice, they also represent the first
option for reform.
This Part surveys the landscape of current state laws and the ways in
which they affect state practice under the Seventeenth Amendment. Based
on these observations, model legislation is proposed that the states could
adopt to ensure that they comply with the Constitution whenever vacancies
arise in the Senate.
A. The State of State Law
To understand the problem with state laws and to propose viable
solutions, one first should consider the laws of each state that govern
elections to fill senatorial vacancies—both as they stand today178 and as
177

See supra Part I.
ALA. CODE §§ 36-9-7 to -8 (LexisNexis 2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.40.140–.165 (2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222 (2006 & Supp. 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-102 (2011); CAL. ELEC.
CODE §§ 10700, 10701, 10703, 10720 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-12-201
(2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (2007); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 100.161; GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1
(LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 59-910 (2012); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/25-8
(LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-13-3-1, -8-3 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 69.8, .11, .12,
.13 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.200 (LexisNexis
2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1278 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2008); MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW §§ 8-401, -602 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 140; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.105 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 204D.22, .28 (West 2009 & Supp.
2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 1997); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 13-25-202 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-565 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.030
(LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661:5 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26
(West 1999 & Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14 (2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42(4-a)
(McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-12 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-08
(2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3521.02 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 12-101 (West 1997
& Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 188.120 (2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2007); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 17-4-9 (2003 & Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 12-11-1, -4 to -7 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-101 (2003); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 201.051,
204.002, .003, .005 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502 (LexisNexis 2010); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2621–2622 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-207 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
178
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they were written just after the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted.179
The first step is to identify those features of state law that affect state
practice.
It should come as no surprise that state legislatures have empowered
governors to appoint replacement senators. Today, about forty-four states
allow appointments whenever a vacancy happens.180 Two states—
Oklahoma and Connecticut—allow appointments in very limited
circumstances.181 And four reject the appointment power altogether.182
§§ 29A.28.030, .041 (West 2005 & Supp. 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-3 (LexisNexis 2011); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 8.50 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); id. § 17.18 (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111
(2011).
179
Act No. 410, 1915 Ala. Acts 364; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2870 (1913); Act of Mar. 28, 1917,
No. 402, 1917 Ark. Acts 1869; Act of May 20, 1913, ch. 156, 1913 Cal. Stat. 237, 237–38; Act of May
2, 1913, ch. 79, 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 267; Act of June 6, 1913, ch. 219, 1913 Conn. Acts 1839, 1839–
43; DEL. REV. STAT. § 1890 (1915); Act of May 26, 1913, ch. 6471, 1913 Fla. Laws 277, 277–78; Act
of Aug. 16, 1913, No. 168, 1913 Ga. Laws 135, 135–36; Act of Mar. 13, 1917, ch. 27, 1917 Idaho Sess.
Laws 68, 68–69; Act of 1872—Election of United States Senator, § 1, 1913 Ill. Laws 307, 307–08; Act
of Feb. 9, 1915, ch. 4, 1915 Ind. Acts 13, 13–14; Act of Apr. 25, 1917, ch. 401, 1917 Iowa Acts 430;
Act of Mar. 2, 1927, ch. 204, 1927 Kan. Sess. Laws 258; Act of Mar. 17, 1914, ch. 25, 1914 Ky. Acts
98, 98–99; Act of July 9, 1914, Act No. 241, 1914 La. Acts 471, 471–72; Act of Mar. 10, 1915, ch. 55,
1915 Me. Laws 35, 35–36; Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 761, 1914 Md. Laws 1337, 1337–39; Act of June
20, 1913, ch. 835, pt. IV, 1913 Mass. Acts 1059, 1059–60; Act of May 7, 1915, No. 156, 1915 Mich.
Pub. Acts 261–62; Act of Apr. 25, 1913, ch. 520, 1913 Minn. Laws 756, 756–58; Act of Feb. 3, 1914,
ch. 148, 1914 Miss. Laws 192, 192–93; MO. REV. STAT. § 4787 (1919); Act of Mar. 8, 1915, ch. 126,
1915 Mont. Laws 281, 281–82; Act of Apr. 25, 1917, ch. 39, 1917 Neb. Laws 117, 117–18; Act of Mar.
6, 1915, ch. 65, 1915 Nev. Stat. 83, 83–84; Act of Mar. 3, 1915, ch. 29, 1915 N.H. Laws 32; Act of
May 5, 1920, ch. 349, § 26, 1920 N.J. Laws 627; Act of Mar. 8, 1915, ch. 27, 1915 N.M. Laws 39; Act
of Dec. 17, 1913, ch. 822, 1913 N.Y. Laws 2418, 2418–19; Act of Mar. 11, 1913, ch. 114, 1913 N.C.
Sess. Laws 206, 206–07; Act of Feb. 16, 1927, ch. 138, 1927 N.D. Laws 175, 175–76; Act of Feb. 14,
1914, No. 3, 1914 Ohio Laws 8, 8–12; Act of Feb. 24, 1915, ch. 49, 1915 Okla. Sess. Laws 57; Act of
Feb. 9, 1915, ch. 48, 1915 Or. Laws 59; Act of July 24, 1913, No. 454, 1913 Pa. Laws 995, 995–96; Act
of Apr. 24, 1914, ch. 1048, 1914 R.I. Pub. Laws 65, 65–68; Act of Mar. 4, 1914, ch. 337, 1914 S.C.
Acts 592, 592–93; Act of Feb. 15, 1915, ch. 182, 1915 S.D. Sess. Laws 367; Act of Sept. 23, 1913, ch.
8, No. 196, 1913 Tenn. Pub. Acts 396, 396–98; Act of Aug. 22, 1913, ch. 39, 1913 Tex. Gen Laws 101,
101–11; Act of Mar. 15, 1915, ch. 48, 1915 Utah Laws 54, 54–55; Act of Feb. 4, 1915, No. 7, 1915 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 70, 70–72; Act of Mar. 20, 1914, ch. 150, 1914 Va. Acts 252; Act of Mar. 15, 1915,
ch. 60, 1915 Wash. Sess. Laws 232; Act of May 3, 1921, ch. 101, 1921 W. Va. Acts 246, 246–47; Act
of July 18, 1913, ch. 634, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 825, 825–29; Act of Feb. 26, 1913, ch. 91, 1913 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 100.
180
Precision on this issue is complicated by the ambiguity in the law of South Dakota, which likely
provides unconstrained appointment power, and Alaska, which likely does not permit appointments. See
State v. Trust the People, 113 P.3d 613, 614 n.1 (Alaska 2005). Among the forty-four states, four limit
the identity of the appointee: Hawaii, Utah, and Wyoming say that the governor must choose from a list
of nominees, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2218-111, while the Governor of Arizona must select an appointee of the same political party as the
senator creating the vacancy, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222(C).
181
Both states only allow appointments during the short term. In addition, Oklahoma law requires
the governor to appoint the senator-elect, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 12-101, and Connecticut requires
the governor’s appointee to be approved by two-thirds of each house of the state’s general assembly,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211(a)(2).
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The data suggest that the appointment power is linked with
shortcomings in state practice, and by this logic nearly every state may risk
impairing the people’s right to elect replacement senators. But banning the
appointment power is not the answer. For one thing, temporary
appointments avoid lapses in representation in the Senate, and the harm of
long lapses is not an insignificant concern.183 Moreover, the mere
possibility of an appointment is not the issue; the problem arises when the
appointment power in some way subverts the election required by the
Amendment. Where the appointment power is paired with a speedy
election, the text and purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment are satisfied.
Unfortunately, a remarkable number of state laws do not pair the
appointment power with the required election. Some states permit
permanent appointments and thus pose a risk of facial noncompliance. The
laws of thirteen states actually require permanent appointments under
certain conditions; when these conditions are met, facial noncompliance
results.184 In this category, some state laws deserve particular scrutiny for
182

Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin clearly prohibit appointments, and Alaska, as mentioned,
appears to have repealed its law governing appointments, though the issue is not resolved. See OR. REV.
STAT. § 188.120; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4-9; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.50, 17.18; Trust the People, 113
P.3d at 614 n.1.
183
In Connecticut and Wisconsin, for example, voters may wait almost six months for an election
to fill a vacancy, during which time they are not represented in the Senate. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-211; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.50, 17.18.
184
The states that expressly provide for permanent appointments are: California, CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 10720 (West 2003) (which seems to permit permanent appointments if a vacancy happens after the
election for the next term); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (if a vacancy happens fewer
than twenty-two days before the election for the next term); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1278
(2012) (if an appointment would last for less than one year); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW,
§ 8-401 (LexisNexis 2010) (if a vacancy happens fewer than twenty-one days before the candidacy
deadline for the second-to-last election in the term, which allows permanent appointments of up to two
years and eight months); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (2007) (which seems to permit
permanent appointments of up to one year); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-565 (2008) (if a vacancy
happens fewer than sixty days before the election for the next term of the seat); New York, N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW § 42(4-a) (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2013) (if a vacancy happens fewer than sixty days
before the primary in the second-to-last cycle in the term, which would allow permanent appointments
of up to two years and six months); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-08 (2009) (if a vacancy
happens fewer than ninety days before the second-to-last election in the term, which would allow
permanent appointments up to two years and five months); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3521.02
(West 2007) (if a vacancy happens fewer than 180 days before the second-to-last election in the term,
which would allow permanent appointments of up to 2 years and 8 months); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 7-19-20 (1977) (if a vacancy happens fewer than 100 days before the second-to-last election in
the term, which would allow permanent appointments of up to 2 years, 5 months, and 10 days); South
Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 12-11-4 to -7 (2004) (which seems to permit permanent appointments
if a vacancy happens after the second-to-last election in the term of the seat, which would allow
permanent appointments of up to two years and two months); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 310-3 (LexisNexis 2011) (if appointment would last less than two years and six months); Wyoming,
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111 (2011) (if a vacancy happens after the second-to-last election in the
term, which would allow permanent appointments of up to two years and two months). There is some
ambiguity in Arkansas law, but its state constitution appears to contemplate permanent appointments.
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permitting exceptionally long permanent appointments: Maryland, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia,
and Wyoming all have statutes that may mandate permanent appointments
longer than two years. In addition, more than twenty other states have
statutes that create permanent appointments by implication.185 Taken
together, more than two-thirds of states have statutes in force that require or
allow governors to appoint permanent replacements and facially defy the
Seventeenth Amendment. Moreover, the situation has gotten worse over
time: it appears that there are more state laws today that allow for facial
noncompliance than there were in 1913.186
Also problematic are those state laws that require elections but still
permit appointees to serve excessively long terms, which result in long
delays before elections to fill vacancies. A commonly used vacancy-filling
rule sets the election by referring to the next general election. If a state fills
a vacancy at the next general election, even without any additional delay,
the people of that state might be left without elected representation for up
to two years. The Obama vacancy is an example. Under Illinois law,
vacancies are to be filled at the next general election.187 Obama resigned
shortly after the 2008 election, which meant that the law required a vacancy
election during the 2010 general election—two years later. And in many
states, the outcome may be worse than a two-year wait.188

ARK. CONST. amend. 29, § 4. And Alaska law provides for permanent appointments, but a later
enactment probably repealed that provision. See Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 614 n.1.
185
In Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia, the law defines the time at which a vacancyfilling election should take place but leaves a gap during which no election will occur. Arkansas,
Missouri, New Jersey, and Wisconsin also may fall into this category.
Commonly, these states provide for a vacancy-filling election at the next general election or at the
next general election after a specified interval. So if there is no general election following the vacancy
(or if the last general election in the term falls within the specified interval in the statute), the
appointment will be permanent. For example, Michigan law provides that the appointee “shall hold
office from the time of his appointment and qualification until the first day of December following the
next general November election which occurs more than 120 days after such vacancy happens.” MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.105 (West 2008). So, if a vacancy happened 119 days before the general
election in the sixth year of the term, the law would not provide for an election to fill the vacancy, and
the people of Michigan could be without elected representation for six months.
186
South Carolina law is a good example. The current law allows permanent appointees to fill
vacancies that occur within 100 days of the second-to-last general election of the term or for up to twoand-one-half years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20. After ratification, South Carolina law required a special
election to be held within 90 days. Act of Mar. 4, 1914, ch. 337, 1914 S.C. Acts 592, 592–93.
187
See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/25-8 (LexisNexis 2012). Illinois not only defied the
Seventeenth Amendment in connection with the Obama vacancy, it nearly violated its own laws by
failing to hold any election until the federal courts stepped in.
188
When a vacancy happens in Maine, for example, state law provides that candidates must
participate in the next primary election that is more than sixty days after the vacancy is created, filling
the vacancy at the subsequent general election. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2008). Maine’s

1230

107:1181 (2013)

Seventeenth Amendment

B. Model Legislation
The foregoing survey demonstrates that state laws across the United
States are not always well suited to the requirements of the Seventeenth
Amendment and they are getting worse. Some state statutes, however, do a
fairly good job effectuating the Amendment’s language and purpose, and
these laws can help to construct model legislation for all states. To improve
compliance with the Seventeenth Amendment, states should adopt the
following model statute for filling Senate vacancies:
An Act for Filling Vacancies in the U.S. Senate
§ 1. When a vacancy occurs in the office of United States Senator, the
governor may make a temporary appointment to fill the vacancy, until the
people fill the vacancy by election.
§ 2. When a vacancy occurs in the office of United States Senator, the
governor is empowered to issue a writ of election calling an election to fill the
vacancy. The writ will specify the day on which the election will occur and a
day for a primary election or nominating convention. The election to fill the
vacancy will be held not more than four months from the date on which the
vacancy occurs, except that if the vacancy occurs within one year of a general
election, the election to fill the vacancy may be held on the same day as the
general election.
§ 3. An individual who is elected to the office of United States Senator for a
regular six-year term will succeed to the office for the remainder of any
unexpired term when the office is vacant or is filled by a gubernatorial
appointee following certification of the election results.

The Seventeenth Amendment requires an election to fill every vacancy
and embodies a strong preference for elected representation, while
recognizing that the states should have the option of maintaining their equal
representation in the Senate. The proposed legislation serves these goals: it
does not permit permanent appointments; it ensures that the length of time
between the creation of a vacancy and the election to fill it remains short;189
primaries usually take place on the second Tuesday in June, id. § 339, which means a vacancy created
in April or May of an election year will not be filled until the November election thirty months later.
An additional concern is the apparent trend toward laws permitting longer delays. Consider
Delaware, where the current law fills the vacancy at the next general election, permitting a delay of
almost two years. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (2007). The Delaware law adopted after passage of
the Seventeenth Amendment, however, provided for a vacancy to be filled at the next general election,
unless that would create a lapse of more than one year, in which case the governor was required to call a
special election. DEL. REV. STAT. § 1890 (1915). Similarly, current Arizona law fills vacancies at the
next general election, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222(A) (2006 & Supp. 2012), while after ratification
the governor was empowered to call a special election if the gap would be longer than six months,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2870 (1913).
189
The proposed legislation uses four months and one year as the maximum times before an
election but leaves some discretion with the governor to set the exact date. Some states have taken
similar approaches. In Texas and Rhode Island, unless there is a general election in the near future, the
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and it allows the state to maintain its equal voice in the Senate through
temporary appointments. In addition, the proposed legislation minimizes
concern about the cost of or turnout for a vacancy election when there is an
upcoming general election; it permits the state in this circumstance to put
off the vacancy election for a slightly longer period so the state does not
have to hold two elections in close proximity.190
The model statute starts from Vermont’s law, which provides a decent
approach to filling vacancies.191 The major difference is the third paragraph.
When a vacancy happens so close to a general election that the state cannot
add the vacancy election to the ballot, or when the vacancy happens after
that election, the only option under Vermont law would be to hold another
election right away (during the short term).192 But the costs of holding a
quick election immediately after a statewide general election may outweigh
the benefits of electing a replacement senator for the last few days of the
term. Moreover, in these cases, the governor might be tempted to let the
term expire without holding an election.193 To solve this problem, a few
states deem by law that the winner of the regular election is the winner of

governor must set an election for as early a date as practicable under state law. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4-9
(2003 & Supp. 2012); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 201.051, 204.002, .003, .005 (West 2010 & Supp.
2012). In New Jersey, the governor has the power to pick a date earlier than called for in the law. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012).
190
Exactly where to draw the line between having a quick election and waiting for an already
scheduled general election is a matter for the state political process. This statute draws that line at four
months. Among the states providing, under some circumstances, a special election for Senate in four
months or less are ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.140 (2010) (between sixty and ninety days); CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 10703 (West Supp. 2012) (between 112 and 126 days); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (2007)
(within ninety days); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (2002) (within three months); and WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 29A.28.041 (West 2005 & Supp. 2013) (within ninety days).
191
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (“If a vacancy occurs in the office of United States senator
or United States representative, the governor shall call a special election to fill the vacancy. His
proclamation shall specify a day for the special election and a day for a special primary, pursuant to
section 2352 of this title. The special election shall be held not more than three months from the date
the vacancy occurs, except that if the vacancy occurs within six months of a general election, the special
election may be held the same day as the general election.”); id. § 2622 (“The governor may make an
interim appointment to fill a vacancy in the office of United States senator, pending the filling of the
vacancy by special election.”). Washington takes a similar approach, though its timeline is slightly more
complex because it takes filing deadlines into account. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 29A.28.030, .041.
The model statute increases the time limits from the Vermont model, but it would not prevent governors
from exercising their discretion to call quicker elections when practicable. See infra note 196.
192
See, e.g., App. B, No. 114 (candidate Carnahan dies after ballots were printed but before the
election), and Nos. 129 & 130 (Senator Pittman dies after being reelected but before the new term
began).
193
Although Vermont’s law says that the governor shall call an election, it would be quite difficult
to successfully prosecute a lawsuit requiring her to issue the writ of election during this short time,
especially since she would only be in technical violation of the law after the three-month period—by
which time the relevant term would be over.
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the vacancy election.194 The accession of a recently elected senator seems
like a reasonable substitute for a slapdash election in the waning days of an
unexpired term, and it is an improvement over leaving the seat empty
during a period (though admittedly short) when business can be done in the
Senate.195 The succession of the regularly elected Senate in the third
paragraph of the model legislation responds to these concerns.
By adopting this legislation, states would take a step toward improving
compliance with the Seventeenth Amendment.196 They would provide their
constituents with more democratic representation more of the time, and
they would not pay large costs or sacrifice their representation in the Senate
to do so. The change is simple to implement and easy to administer, and it
is by all accounts a change that is within reach.
CONCLUSION
The reform movement that culminated in the Seventeenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution rallied against shortcomings in the process of
legislative selection of senators. These problems heralded a great redesign
of the American republic in the early twentieth century. The reform
movement identified popular elections as the remedy, and thus the
constitutional amendment promoted that value over all others. This value is
embodied in the first paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment, which
calls for each senator to be elected directly every six years. At the same
time, the Senate was to retain its character as a body in which states are
represented as sovereign equals. The reformers took care to preserve this
premise, and thus the second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment
194

In Minnesota and Massachusetts, if a vacancy happens shortly before the regular election for the
next term, the regular-election winner is deemed by law to be the winner of the election to fill the
vacancy. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28, subdiv. 12 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013) (applying if a seat is
vacant or filled by an appointee at the time of the election); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 140(d)
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2013) (applying if a seat is vacant at the time of the election). In Iowa, the
same applies to vacancies created just before a new election or between the election and the start of the
new term. IOWA CODE ANN. § 69.12(2) (West 2012). Oklahoma reaches the same result in a different
way: the governor’s limited appointment power only applies to senators-elect during the short term.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 12-101(B) (West 1997 & Supp. 2013).
195
If the senator who created the vacancy in the short term is also the senator-elect, this model
statute requires a special election to fill the seat for the new term. See App. B, Nos. 129 & 130
(Pittman).
196
Even if states do not pass new laws, states and state actors can improve compliance with the
Seventeenth Amendment incrementally. One obvious example would be for governors to exercise their
discretion, where present, to call earlier elections. See supra note 189. Another opportunity presents
itself in the case of senators contemplating resignation. In these circumstances, the senator and the
governor might agree informally that the senator will resign, only to be reappointed immediately by the
governor pending the outcome of the vacancy election. Under the Seventeenth Amendment, the
governor may not issue a writ of election until a vacancy happens, so the formal resignation is
necessary to start the state’s electoral machinery. But at the same time, by reappointing the resigning
senator, the people of the state would be represented continuously by winners of Senate elections.
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applies the broad goal of popular elections to vacancies in the Senate and
also supplies a way that equal suffrage can be maintained. Every vacancy
must be filled by election, but the governor of the state, if empowered by
the state legislature, may make temporary appointments until the election
can be held. To make sure that the second paragraph functioned properly,
the framers of the Seventeenth Amendment reaffirmed that regulation of
congressional elections should be divided between the states in the first
instance and the national government, and they divided control over
vacancy elections and temporary appointments between the branches of the
state governments.
For nearly 100 years since the Seventeenth Amendment became the
law of the land there has been considerable state defiance of its careful
design. One of every six Senate vacancies is filled by an appointee who
serves the remainder of an unexpired term in facial violation of the
Seventeenth Amendment. In an additional third of all Senate vacancies, the
states waited more than a year to put an elected replacement in office, and
in so doing allowed appointees without direct democratic approval to serve
for extended periods in lieu of popularly elected replacements. The people
have been denied 200 years’ worth of elected representation so far, and the
practice of state defiance has grown more common over time. This pattern
of state behavior is in direct contradiction to the core reasons that the
Seventeenth Amendment became part of the Constitution in the first place.
The overall effect of state defiance is significant, but the individual
harms have been more diffuse. A few months’ delay before an election here
or an appointee who serves the unexpired term there at most provokes
attention in isolated cases, but it provides little incentive for the states to
comply with the federal Constitution. The Obama vacancy has brought
renewed attention to these issues. Federal wire taps, cronyism, and
“fucking golden” opportunities became the “Treasons of the Senate” for the
twenty-first century. And these new watchwords may provoke a new push
for reform.
After 1913, the people were supposed to elect senators in all
circumstances. This goal has not been realized. The solution is not to alter
the Seventeenth Amendment but to improve state compliance with its
terms. The states’ duty to direct congressional elections carries with it a
responsibility to ensure that any alleged infringement of the right of the
people to vote is carefully and meticulously scrutinized. The states must
meet their burden and make good on the 100-year-old promise that each
senator is “elected by the people.”
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APPENDIX A
FINDINGS

Appendix A presents findings based on data collected on every
vacancy in the Senate from the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment on
May 31, 1913, to November 6, 2012. For purposes of analyzing the data,
we have coded each vacancy with the following three variables in mind:
(1) the manner in which the senator who creates the vacancy was elected to
that seat in the first place, (2) the event causing the vacancy, and (3) the
method by which the vacancy is filled. For each coding category we have
calculated the total number of vacancies, the portion of the vacancy during
which the Senate seat is left empty, the portion filled by an appointee or an
elected replacement, and the time during the vacancy that the people were
without elected representation.197
1. How the Vacating Senator Was Elected.—A senator who causes a
vacancy in the Senate will have been elected to the term in question in one
of three ways. The senator may have won the seat in a regular election; he
or she could have been elected to the term to fill a prior vacancy during that
term; or he or she may never have been seated for the term in which the
vacancy is created. The last of these categories consists of people who are
elected and then die before taking office, as well as those whom the Senate
refuses to seat after they have presented their credentials. We represent the
three options as follows:
A Senator creating the vacancy was elected in a regular election for his or her
seat
B Senator creating the vacancy was elected to the seat in an election to fill an
earlier vacancy
C Senator creating the vacancy was never seated for the term in which the
vacancy occurs

2. How the Vacancy Was Created.—The second coding category
identifies the cause of the vacancy. A sitting senator can be removed from
office; the Senate might refuse to qualify any senator for a seat; a sitting
senator may die; or resign. It is important in cases of death or resignation to
note whether the senator left the Senate before the regular election for the
next term of his or her seat or afterwards (in the latter case the senator

197

We provide a more detailed explanation of how we calculate periods of time, information on
individual vacancies, and further discussion of our dataset in Appendix B. See The Meaning of the
Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance: Appendices, NW. U. L. REV., http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/v107/n3/1181/LR107n3CloptonAppendices.pdf; SOC. SCI. RES.
NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280361.
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creates a “technical vacancy” during a lame-duck session of Congress). We
categorize each vacancy in one of the following six categories:
U Sitting senator removed from office198
V Senate refuses to certify any senator following an election
W Sitting senator dies before the regular election for the next term
X Sitting senator resigns before the regular election for the next term
Y Sitting senator dies after the regular election for the next term
Z Sitting senator resigns after the regular election for the next term

3. How the Vacancy Was Filled.—Perhaps the most important
coding category for our study is the manner in which the vacancy is filled.
Here we identify seven different categories. The first consists of cases
where a person is appointed to fill the remaining days of a term after the
regular election for the next term of that seat. In almost all cases, this
person is a senator-elect taking his or her seat just before the start of the
term for which he or she was elected. The second and third categories
cover situations in which the state executive temporarily appoints an
interim senator to a vacant seat and then the state holds an election to select
a replacement senator to fill the vacancy. The difference between the
second and third categories is whether the election to fill the vacancy takes
place at the same time as the regular election for the next term of the seat in
question or at some other time. The fourth category represents those cases
where the state executive appoints a permanent replacement to fill the
vacancy and the state never holds an election. As we discuss in our Article,
this category of cases represents the most blatant noncompliance with the
terms of the Seventeenth Amendment. The fifth and sixth categories consist
of cases where the state holds an election to fill the vacancy without any
appointee serving before the elected replacement. Like the second and third
categories, the difference between the fifth and sixth categories relates to
when the election to fill the vacancy is held. Finally, the seventh category
covers instances where the state leaves the vacancy in the Senate unfilled
through the end of the term. We code these possibilities:
1 The state executive appoints a replacement senator to fill the remainder of a
term after the regular election for the next term
2 The state executive temporarily appoints a replacement senator and then
the state holds an election to fill the vacancy at some time other than the
regularly scheduled election for the next term of the seat in question

198

Since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate has not removed any senators
from office. For a complete list of expulsions and censures in the history of the Senate, see Expulsion
and Censure, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Expulsion_
Censure.htm (last visited May 15, 2013).
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3 The state executive temporarily appoints a replacement senator and then
the state holds an election to fill the vacancy at the same time as the
regularly scheduled election for the next term of the seat in question
4 The state executive permanently appoints a senator to fill the vacancy and
the state never holds an election
5 The state executive does not make an appointment and the state holds an
election to fill the vacancy at some time other than the regularly scheduled
election for the next term of the seat in question
6 The state executive does not make an appointment and the state holds an
election to fill the vacancy at the same time as the regularly scheduled
election for the next term of the seat in question
7 The state leaves the vacancy unfilled through the end of the term
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Total
Vacancies
#

Total Time Seat Left Empty at
Start of Vacancy

Average Time Seat Left
Empty at Start of Vacancy

Days

Y/M/D

Days

Y/M/D

22

22 days

All

244

5272

14 yrs., 5 mos.,
12 days

A

228

4906

13 yrs., 5 mos.,
11 days

22

22 days

B

10

63

2 mos., 3 days

6

6 days
1 mo., 21 days

C

6

303

10 mos., 3 days

51

U

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

V

3

303

10 mos., 3 days

101

3 mos., 11 days

W

142

4025

11 yrs., 10 days

28

28 days

X

55

758

2 yrs., 28 days

14

14 days

Y

6

114

3 mos., 24 days

19

19 days

Z

38

72

2 mos., 12 days

2

2 days

1

40

91

3 mos., 1 day

2

2 days

2

113

1789

4 yrs., 10 mos.,
29 days

16

16 days

3

39

700

1 yr., 11 mos., 5 days

18

18 days

4

30

448

1 yr., 2 mos., 23 days

15

15 days

5

17

2070

5 yrs., 8 mos., 5 days

122

4 mos., 2 days

6

1

79

2 mos., 19 days

79

2 mos., 19 days

7

4

95

3 mos., 5 days

24

24 days

2+3+4+5+6

200

5086

13 yrs., 11 mos.,
11 days

25

25 days

1+2+3+4

222

3028

8 yrs., 3 mos., 18 days

14

14 days

2+3+4

182

2937

8 yrs., 17 days

16

16 days

27

27 days

2+3+5+6

170

4638

12 yrs., 8 mos.,
18 days

2+3

152

2489

6 yrs., 9 mos., 29 days

16

16 days

5+6

18

2149

5 yrs., 10 mos.,
24 days

119

3 mos., 29 days
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Total Time Vacancy Filled By
Appointment

Average Time Vacancy
Filled by Appointment

#

Days

Y/M/D

Days

Y/M/D

All

222

65,431

179 yrs., 3 mos., 6 days

295

9 mos., 25 days

A

207

60,570

165 yrs., 11 mos.,
15 days

293

9 mos., 23 days

B

10

2400

6 yrs., 7 mos.

240

8 mos.

C

5

2461

6 yrs., 9 mos., 1 day

492

1 yr., 4 mos.,
7 days

U

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

V

2

396

1 yr., 1 mo., 1 day

198

6 mos., 18 days

W

127

40,159

110 yrs., 9 days

316

10 mos., 16 days

X

53

24,161

66 yrs., 2 mos., 11 days

456

1 yr., 3 mos., 1 day

Y

5

191

6 mos., 11 days

38

1 mo., 8 days

Z

35

524

1 yr., 5 mos., 9 days

15

15 days

1

40

715

1 yr., 11 mos., 20 days

18

18 days

2

113

35,083

96 yrs., 1 mo., 13 days

310

10 mos., 10 days

439

1 yr., 2 mos.,
14 days

3

39

17,108

46 yrs., 10 mos.,
18 days

4

30

12,525

34 yrs., 3 mos., 25 days

418

1 yr., 1 mo.,
23 days

5

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

6

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

7

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2+3+4+5+6

182

64,716

177 yrs., 3 mos.,
21 days

356

11 mos., 26 days

1+2+3+4

222

65,431

179 yrs., 3 mos., 6 days

295

9 mos., 25 days

2+3+4

182

64,716

177 yrs., 3 mos.,
21 days

356

11 mos., 26 days

2+3+5+6

152

52,191

142 yrs., 11 mos.,
28 days

343

11 mos., 13 days

2+3

152

52,191

142 yrs., 11 mos.,
28 days

343

11 mos., 13 days

5+6

0

0

0

0

0
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Vacancies
Filled by
Special
Election
#

Total Time Vacancy Filled by
Elected Replacement

Average Time Vacancy Filled by
Elected Replacement

Days

Y/M/D

Days

Y/M/D

807

2 yrs., 2 mos., 17 days

All

170

137,179

375 yrs., 10 mos.,
4 days

A

161

128,018

350 yrs., 8 mos.,
28 days

795

2 yrs., 2 mos., 5 days

B

3

911

2 yrs., 6 mos., 1 day

304

10 mos., 4 days

C

6

8250

22 yrs., 7 mos.,
10 days

1375

3 yrs., 9 mos., 10 days

U

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1434

3 yrs., 11 mos., 9 days

V

3

4302

11 yrs., 9 mos.,
17 days

W

126

104,894

287 yrs., 4 mos.,
19 days

832

2 yrs., 3 mos., 12 days

X

41

27,983

76 yrs., 8 mos.,
3 days

683

1 yr., 10 mos., 18 days

Y

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Z

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2

113

116,555

319 yrs., 4 mos.

1031

2 yrs., 10 mos., 1 day

3

39

2709

7 yrs., 5 mos., 4 days

69

2 mos., 9 days

4

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

5

17

17,797

48 yrs., 9 mos.,
7 days

1047

2 yrs., 10 mos., 17 days

6

1

118

3 mos., 28 days

118

3 mos., 28 days

7

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

170

137,179

375 yrs., 10 mos.,
4 days

807

2 yrs., 2 mos., 17 days

1+2+3+4

152

119,264

326 yrs., 9 mos.,
4 days

785

2 yrs., 1 mo., 25 days

2+3+4

152

119,264

326 yrs., 9 mos.,
4 days

785

2 yrs., 1 mo., 25 days

2+3+5+6

170

137,179

375 yrs., 10 mos.,
4 days

807

2 yrs., 2 mos., 17 days

2+3

152

119,264

326 yrs., 9 mos.,
4 days

785

2 yrs., 1 mo., 25 days

5+6

18

17,915

49 yrs., 1 mo.

995

2 yrs., 8 mos., 25 days

2+3+4+5+
6
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Vacancies with
Period of No

Total Time During Vacancy

Average Time During

Without Elected
Representation

Vacancy Without Elected
Representation

Elected
Representation
#

Days

Y/M/D

Days

Y/M/D

291

9 mos., 21 days

All

244

71,101

194 yrs., 9 mos.,
21 days

A

228

65,870

180 yrs., 5 mos.,
20 days

289

9 mos., 19 days

B

10

2466

6 yrs., 9 mos., 6 days

247

8 mos., 7 days
1 yr., 3 mos., 6 days

C

6

2765

7 yrs., 7 mos.

461

U

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

V

3

700

1 yr., 11 mos., 5 days

233

7 mos., 23 days

W

142

44,516

121 yrs., 11 mos.,
16 days

313

10 mos., 13 days

X

55

24,984

68 yrs., 5 mos.,
14 days

454

1 yr., 2 mos.,
29 days

Y

6

305

10 mos., 5 days

51

1 mo., 21 days

Z

38

596

1 yr., 7 mos., 21 days

16

16 days

20

20 days

1

40

806

2 yrs., 2 mos.,
21 days

2

113

37,106

101 yrs., 8 mos.,
1 day

328

10 mos., 28 days

3

39

17,904

49 yrs., 19 days

459

1 yr., 3 mos., 4 days

435

1 yr., 2 mos.,
10 days

4

30

13,041

35 yrs., 8 mos.,
21 days

5

17

2070

5 yrs., 8 mos., 5 days

122

4 mos., 2 days

6

1

79

2 mos., 19 days

79

2 mos., 19 days

7

4

95

3 mos., 5 days

24

24 days

2+3+4+5+6

200

70,200

192 yrs., 4 mos.

351

11 mos., 21 days

310

10 mos., 10 days

1+2+3+4

222

68,857

188 yrs., 7 mos.,
27 days

2+3+4

182

68,051

186 yrs., 5 mos.,
11 days

374

1 yr., 9 days

2+3+5+6

170

57,159

156 yrs., 7 mos.,
9 days

336

11 mos., 6 days

2+3

152

55,010

150 yrs., 8 mos.,
20 days

362

11 mos., 28 days

5+6

18

2149

5 yrs., 10 mos.,
24 days

119

3 mos., 29 days
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1242
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

AU1
AU2
AU3
AU4
AU5
AU6
AU7
AV1
AV2
AV3
AV4
AV5
AV6
AV7

AX7

AX6

AX5

AX4

AX3

AX2

AX1

AW7

AW6

AW5

AW4

AW3

AW2

AW1

0

0

2

13

10

28

0

0

1

14

15

27

79

0

AZ7

AZ6

AZ5

AZ4

AZ3

AZ2

AZ1

AY7

AY6

AY5

AY4

AY3

AY2

AY1

3

0

0

0

0

0

30

1

0

0

0

0

0

5

BV7

BV6

BV5

BV4

BV3

BV2

BV1

BU7

BU6

BU5

BU4

BU3

BU2

BU1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

BX7

BX6

BX5

BX4

BX3

BX2

BX1

BW7

BW6

BW5

BW4

BW3

BW2

BW1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

BZ7

BZ6

BZ5

BZ4

BZ3

BZ2

BZ1

BY7

BY6

BY5

BY4

BY3

BY2

BY1

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

TOTAL VACANCIES PER CODING CATEGORY

CV7

CV6

CV5

CV4

CV3

CV2

CV1

CU7

CU6

CU5

CU4

CU3

CU2

CU1

0

0

1

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CX7

CX6

CX5

CX4

CX3

CX2

CX1

CW7

CW6

CW5

CW4

CW3

CW2

CW1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

CZ7

CZ6

CZ5

CZ4

CZ3

CZ2

CZ1

CY7

CY6

CY5

CY4

CY3

CY2

CY1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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